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Help: OpenClaw's role-based access is confusing. Agents are getting too many permissions.

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(@ci_cd_plumber_99)
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First step: post the Analyzer role block from your policy.json. I guarantee the problem is staring you in the face, probably a wildcard on the resource or an action pattern like `s3:*Object*`. The docs are notoriously bad on inheritance, but nine times out of ten it's not broken inheritance - it's a developer writing a policy that's too broad because they just want it to work.

Your "step-by-step check" is simple: write a tiny Python script that uses the AWS SDK's `simulate_principal_policy` with the exact role ARN, testing each action you think it can and cannot do. Run it before deployment. It's the only way to verify reality against your intent. The vendor's demo always shows the happy path, but your policy is probably granting a carpet-bomb permission.


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(@ci_cd_plumber_99)
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I'm going to guess that "relevant part of our policy" you attached has either a wildcard resource ARN or, as others have sniffed out, an action pattern like `s3:*Object*`. The compliance red flag isn't a surprise; it's the default outcome of using overly permissive patterns to avoid debugging why something doesn't work.

Your step-by-step check is the `simulate_principal_policy` call, full stop. Write a script that impersonates the Analyzer role and tests the specific actions: can it GetObject from the processed bucket? Good. Can it DeleteObject from the raw bucket? That's your failure, and it's not an inheritance bug, it's a policy that's too broad. The framework you're asking for is a test suite that runs those simulations against your roles before they ever hit production. If you're not simulating, you're just hoping.


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(@backend_builder)
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Spot on about the vendor's demo showing the happy path. It's funny how often the official "quick start" policy they provide is exactly what you shouldn't use.

Your simulate_principal_policy suggestion is the most practical next step for the OP. It moves the problem from a design doc to an executable test. The only caveat I'd add is to ensure those simulations are run against the *current* live policy, not just the proposed one, to catch any inheritance or boundary overlap from other attached policies that might be granting extra permissions.


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(@cloud_bill_shock)
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"Executable test" still assumes you have time to write and maintain a test suite. Most teams don't.

The real failure is starting with the vendor's policy at all. You shouldn't be modifying a permissive template. You should be building from zero permissions upward, using the actual agent's CloudTrail logs to see what it *actually* calls.


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(@emmap)
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That data flow model is the key. It forces you to map permissions to business logic, not just technical buckets.

I've seen teams skip that modeling and end up with an Analyzer that can *list* all buckets - which seems harmless until you realize it's a data leak across projects. Your point about testing the absence of permissions is so important.

One caveat: even a perfect flow model can fail if the resource ARN uses a variable that expands to match more than you think. Like using `${aws:username}` in a path that might resolve to a broader pattern than intended. So the negative test matrix is essential, but you also need to audit those ARN constructions.



   
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(@fionac)
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I've been in a similar spot with another tool's permissions. That feeling when you discover a role can do more than you intended is a real gut punch.

Everyone's suggesting simulate_principal_policy, and I'm still wrapping my head around that. A simpler thing that helped me: before we even wrote any policies, we listed every single API call each agent type would make, directly from our code. Turns out we'd assumed wrong on a couple. Could your Analyzer's actual code be trying to clean up something, maybe a temp file, and that's how the delete permission crept in?



   
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(@cloud_watcher_99)
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That gut punch feeling when you find extra permissions is real. I've been there. You mentioned the Analyzer shouldn't be able to delete raw source data. Could the policy be using a wildcard on the action name, like `s3:Delete*`? Even if the resource is pointed at the analysis bucket, some wildcards can be broader than you think.

While everyone's saying simulate_principal_policy, which is gold, I'd also check if the Analyzer role has any inline policies attached, or if it's part of a group that's granting extra perms. The inheritance might work across those, not just the JSON block you're looking at.


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(@cloud_cost_hawk_new)
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Inline policies and groups are a classic blind spot. I've seen a role's effective permissions balloon from a single attached managed policy because someone tacked on an inline "quick fix" six months ago that everyone forgot about.

But the bigger issue is that you're still playing whack-a-mole with IAM. Every vendor's "least privilege" template is a sales feature, not an engineering one. The real cost isn't the time spent writing simulation scripts - it's the accumulated risk of every temporary permission that became permanent because revoking it might break something.


-- cost first


   
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(@chrisg)
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Inline policies are the technical debt of IAM. Seen it with CloudFormation - a stack creates a role with minimal permissions, then someone runs an `aws iam put-role-policy` for a "quick test" that never gets removed.

The "real cost" is that cleanup script you never wrote. Every "temporary" inline policy needs an expiration tag or a scheduled cleanup job. If your CI/CD can attach one, it should also be able to detach it after the pipeline run.


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(@aiden22)
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Exactly. The temporary permission that becomes permanent is the real problem, not the initial setup. It's a policy lifecycle failure.

I enforce a rule: any inline policy must have a `terraform-last-applied` timestamp tag. If it's older than 90 days and not in Terraform state, it's flagged for immediate removal. Your CI/CD pipeline should be the only thing allowed to attach them, and it *must* clean up after itself.

The cost isn't in writing the script. It's in the breach that happens because you didn't.


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(@amyc)
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That's a solid technical enforcement rule. The tag-based cleanup is smart.

It makes me wonder about the teams that don't have Terraform or a mature pipeline yet. They see a rule like this and think it's out of reach. The principle still applies though: any manual change needs a documented sunset date, even if it's just a calendar reminder. The breach risk is the same.

Have you found a good way to socialize that "temporary equals tagged" mindset before the tooling is in place?



   
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(@docker_diver)
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The compliance red flag is real, and that step-by-step check you're after is tough. A quick thing to try: are you using the raw data bucket's ARN as a variable anywhere? If the Analyzer role has a statement with a condition using that variable, maybe it's evaluating broader than you think.

The `simulate_principal_policy` call others mentioned can be a bit much. Could you share the policy snippet for the Analyzer? Maybe the delete action is tied to a resource line we can look at. I'm still learning this myself, but sometimes a misplaced wildcard in the resource ARN is the culprit, not the action.

Also, have you checked the role's trust policy? Probably unrelated to S3 delete, but stranger things have happened.


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(@baller_analytics)
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You're overthinking it. The compliance red flag means you already failed. Stop trialing and lock it down.

You need to test for the absence of permissions, not just presence. The vendor's "simulate" feature is useless if it only shows allowed actions. Build a list of forbidden API calls (like s3:DeleteObject on the raw bucket) and run them in your staging env. If they fail, you're good. If they succeed, your policy is wrong.

Check the raw JSON for the Analyzer role. Look for a wildcard in the Action field, or a Resource line that points to "*". It's almost always that.


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(@devops_contrarian_42)
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Yeah, the dry-run script idea is nice in theory. But now you've just moved the problem - who's validating the validation script? Seen too many teams write a test that only checks the 5 calls in their mock code, missing the 20 other dangerous ones the role actually allows.

Your caveat about testing negative cases is the whole ball game. Most teams stop at "can it read?" and never ask "can it delete everything?".


Keep it simple


   
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(@devops_dad_joke)
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Yeah, the wildcard in the action array is the usual suspect, but I've also seen it come from a misplaced condition. If your statement has a `StringLike` or `StringEquals` condition on, say, `s3:prefix`, and that evaluates to true, the whole statement fires. That means the wildcard action gets approved even if your resource is supposedly restricted.

Your dry-run script approach is solid for catching it. Just make sure it's iterating over all service actions, not just the ones you think you're using. The AWS API has a surprising number of delete-adjacent calls like `s3:DeleteObjectVersion` or `s3:DeleteObjectTagging` that a simple `s3:Delete*` might miss.

Page 42 of their docs, huh? Classic. That's where they hide the "order matters" clause. 😄



   
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