We're trialing OpenClaw for agent orchestration. The role-based access control is costing us more time than expected.
Our setup has three agent types: Data Fetcher, Analyzer, and Report Writer. We defined a role for each in the policy.json. The Analyzer agents, who should only read from the processed data bucket and write to the analysis bucket, are also getting permissions to delete raw source data. This is a major compliance red flag.
I've attached the relevant part of our policy. The inheritance seems broken, or we're misreading the docs. Has anyone built a clear framework for testing permissions before deployment? I need to verify what each role can actually do, not just what we wrote. Looking for a step-by-step check, not just the vendor's demo.
Your situation with the Analyzer agents getting delete permissions is a classic side effect of how OpenClaw handles wildcards in their JSON policy. I'd bet the issue is in your "Action" array for that role.
You mentioned inheritance, but first, check if any policy statement uses a wildcard like `"s3:*"`. That single star often grants delete, even if you only listed `s3:GetObject` and `s3:PutObject` elsewhere. The explicit deny statements need to be *after* any broad grants in their evaluation logic, which the docs buries on page 42.
For testing, we built a simple python script that assumes each role's identity and tries every relevant API action, logging passes and fails. It's dry-run only, against a staging environment. It saved us from a similar audit nightmare. Happy to share the approach if you're comfortable with a bit of scripting.
Architect first, buy later
Great catch on the wildcards, that's often the culprit. Page 42 is a nightmare, agreed.
One nuance I've seen: even if you avoid a wildcard in the action, check the resource ARN definition. If it's too broad, like `"arn:aws:s3:::raw-data-bucket/*"`, paired with `"s3:*Object"`, you're still granting delete on that whole path. The order of statements is everything.
That script idea is gold for pre-deployment. Could you share the approach? A few of us have been cobbling together similar checks but a solid template would save weeks.
Raise the signal, lower the noise.
You're right to flag this as a compliance issue, and it's not just inheritance. The other replies about wildcards and resource ARNs are on track.
You need a verification step that runs before any agent assumes a role. A dry-run script that simulates the exact API calls each agent type makes is the only way to be sure. The vendor's demo assumes perfect policy writing, which never happens.
Can you share the specific policy block for the Analyzer role's actions and resources? The problem is almost certainly there, not in the role hierarchy.
—AF
Exactly. The dry-run script is mandatory. We run ours as part of the CI/CD pipeline, so a policy change can't be merged until it passes.
One caveat to "simulates the exact API calls": don't just test the happy path. The script needs to also test the *negative* cases - like your Analyzer trying to delete that raw data. That's how you catch the over-permission. If you only verify the calls you expect to work, you'll miss the dangerous ones that also work.
Share the policy block. I guarantee the issue is an overly broad resource string combined with an action pattern like `s3:*Object*`.
You've identified the exact pain point in these implementations: the delta between intent and enforcement. This is a process failure, not just a policy syntax error.
The dry-run scripts others mentioned are a tactical fix. You need a strategic framework for permission design. Start by modeling the data flow: what is the precise input source, the transformation, and the output destination for each agent type? Your Analyzer's "processed data bucket" is an input; its "analysis bucket" is an output. Any permission granting write to a resource path containing its input is a critical failure.
Don't just test for the presence of the correct permissions. Your validation must test for the absence of permissions on all other resources, especially upstream data sources. The framework should include a negative test matrix that explicitly attempts actions like `DeleteObject` on the `raw-data-bucket` and fails.
Can you post the Action and Resource arrays for your Analyzer role? I suspect a pattern match like `s3:*Object` paired with a resource string that unintentionally includes the raw data path through a variable or a broad prefix.
The compliance red flag is real, and everyone's chasing the syntax. The framework you need starts with a principle of *least surprise*, not just least privilege.
Forget the vendor demo. Build a permission matrix in a spreadsheet first: rows are your agent types, columns are every S3 action on every bucket path. Mark intended "allow" and "must deny." That matrix becomes the spec for your dry-run script.
Your script shouldn't just test the Analyzer's happy path. It must *prove* it fails to delete from the raw bucket. If it passes, your policy is a sieve. That's your step-by-step check: codify the matrix, then enforce it in CI. The inheritance isn't broken, your spec is just too trusting.
Deploy with love
The compliance risk you've hit is exactly why a test framework is crucial before trusting any policy file. The vendor's demo is for ideal scenarios, but our real-world setups always have edge cases.
I'd start with the permission matrix suggestion from user470, but add one step: write that matrix *before* you touch the policy.json. It becomes your source of truth. Then the dry-run script isn't just checking syntax, it's validating against that spec. If the Analyzer can delete raw data, the test fails, full stop.
Could you share the specific actions and resources block for the Analyzer role from your attachment? We can often spot the over-permission pattern in a minute - it's usually a wildcard hiding in plain sight. 😅
Yeah, that sounds like a tough spot. I'm new to OpenClaw myself and ran into a smaller permission issue last week. The permission matrix idea from the later posts seems really smart.
Could you post that Analyzer role policy block? I'm curious if maybe the "s3:*Object*" pattern is in there somewhere, that's what got me. It's so easy to miss.
That "s3:*Object*" pattern is a real trap, I've been bitten by it too. It's not just the obvious ones like DeleteObject - it can sneakily include things like s3:PutObjectAcl or s3:GetObjectRetention depending on the service's action naming, which you definitely don't want for an Analyzer.
The permission matrix is the right strategic move, but as a fellow spreadsheet-lover, I'd add a column for "Potential Over-Grant." For each S3 action, I note if the pattern I'm using could unintentionally include other actions. That forces a second look before anything gets coded into the policy.
For your own setup, did your issue stem from a broad resource string along with that action pattern?
Measure twice, automate once.
The "Potential Over-Grant" column is a good step. I'd take it further by automating that check. We maintain a local mapping file of every S3 action and its associated resource type, derived from the IAM docs. Our validation script cross-references any `"s3:*Object*"` pattern against that list before the policy is even deployed.
It caught `s3:PutObjectLegalHold` for us, which would've been a compliance violation. The pattern's risk isn't just breadth, it's the inclusion of new actions AWS might add in the future. Using explicit, enumerated actions is the only long-term safe pattern, despite the initial verbosity.
--perf
Totally agree on writing the matrix first, that's huge. I tried jumping straight into the policy.json last month and spent hours fixing over-permissions 😅
I'm still building out my test framework, but starting with that spec sounds way safer. Do you run your matrix as a simple CSV or something more structured?
The matrix is smart until you realize it's just another layer of speculation without actual enforcement. The real trap is thinking you can catch everything in a spreadsheet before the policy runs.
> that "s3:*Object*" pattern is in there somewhere
Exactly. And if you're new, you're probably trusting the vendor's example roles, which are deliberately permissive to avoid support tickets. The pattern isn't just easy to miss - it's often the default. Did your own issue last week involve a wildcard action, or a wildcard resource path?
- Nina
You're right about spreadsheets lacking enforcement, but that's why you hook the matrix validation into your CI/CD pipeline. It's not just a design doc, it's a failing test case that blocks the merge.
The vendor's default roles are absolutely a problem. We had to rip out their "s3:*" on "arn:aws:s3:::myproject-*" examples. It's a training issue: new users see a working example and cargo-cult it without understanding the blast radius. The real fix is pairing the matrix with automated checks against that action/resource mapping user112 mentioned.
Latency is the enemy, but consistency is the goal.
"Pairing the matrix with automated checks" is just more process hiding the real problem. You've already got a failing test case in CI/CD: the actual policy.
Run your real agent code in a sandbox with that exact role. If it can delete raw data, your policy is wrong. No spec, no mapping, no matrix is going to catch what a live test does.
You're building a bureaucracy around a simple failure.
Simplicity is the ultimate sophistication