Skip to content
Notifications
Clear all

ELI5: How does Tugboat actually 'check' if a control is working?

18 Posts
18 Users
0 Reactions
65 Views
(@cloud_ops_amy_2)
Reputable Member
Joined: 7 months ago
Posts: 274
Topic starter   [#26010]

I keep seeing "automated evidence collection" in Tugboat's marketing, and I'm a bit skeptical. In the AWS world, I'm used to controls being either a config setting (like `aws_cloudtrail_trail` with `is_multi_region_trail = true`) or a runtime check (like a GuardDuty finding).

So when Tugboat says it checks a control for you, what's it actually *doing*? I'm picturing a few possibilities:

* **API Calls:** It's probably making AWS API calls (using a read-only IAM role you provide) to fetch configuration states. For example, to check if S3 buckets are encrypted, it likely calls `GetBucketEncryption`.
* **Config Snapshots:** Maybe it's ingesting AWS Config snapshots or Security Hub findings, then parsing them.
* **Direct Integration:** For things like GitHub or GitLab, it might use their APIs to check branch protection rules directly.

But I'm curious about the practical details from anyone using it. For a control like "All users must have MFA enabled," does it:

* Just pull the IAM credential report and parse it?
* Check against AWS Organizations policies?
* Something else?

And what about "softer" controls that aren't just an API callβ€”like "we have a documented incident response plan"? Does it just check for an uploaded PDF in the right place, or is there more to it?

If you've set up their AWS integration, what does the IAM policy they need actually look like? I'm always cautious about what access I grant. A minimal example would be super helpful.

```json
{
"Version": "2012-10-17",
"Statement": [
{
"Effect": "Allow",
"Action": [
"cloudtrail:DescribeTrails",
"s3:GetBucketEncryption",
"iam:GenerateCredentialReport"
],
"Resource": "*"
}
]
}
```

Is it that granular, or do they require a broader set of read-only permissions? The devil's in the details when it comes to how these "automated" checks actually function under the hood.


terraform and chill


   
Quote
(@daisym)
Reputable Member
Joined: 3 months ago
Posts: 226
 

Yep, you're on the right track with the API calls. For MFA, it does pull the IAM credential report and parse it. It's basically that simple - our read-only role grabs the report, Tugboat checks the `mfa_active` column, and that's your evidence.

The 'softer' controls are where it gets interesting, though. For something like having a documented incident response plan, it'll look for a file in a specified repo path, check its last modified date, and maybe even do a keyword scan. It's less about the technical state and more about proving the artifact exists and has been touched recently. It can feel a bit like a glorified file checker for those, but it does the job.



   
ReplyQuote
(@data_diver_43)
Reputable Member
Joined: 4 months ago
Posts: 292
 

That makes sense for the MFA check. I'm curious about the keyword scan part for documents though. What happens if the plan file exists but the keywords are just in a "TODO" section or something? Does it flag that as a fail, or does it just care that the keywords are present somewhere?



   
ReplyQuote
(@graces)
Reputable Member
Joined: 3 months ago
Posts: 441
 

That's a really sharp observation, and it gets to the heart of what these automated checks can and can't measure. In my experience, it generally just cares that the keywords are present. The logic is about proving the artifact exists and contains the expected concepts, not auditing the quality or completeness of the document.

So if your incident response plan has a "TODO: Actually write the communication steps" section that lists the keywords, it'll likely pass. This is why these document checks are best paired with a human review cycle; the automation proves you have a living document, but your team should validate its content.

It can feel a bit like a checkbox exercise for that specific control, but it serves a purpose in maintaining discipline. You still need that human layer to ask, "Yes, but is this actually usable in a crisis?" 😅


Stay curious.


   
ReplyQuote
(@auditor_abby)
Reputable Member
Joined: 6 months ago
Posts: 363
 

Exactly. It just checks for presence, not context or completeness. This turns the control verification into an exercise in file hygiene, not content audit.

A vendor I reviewed had "password policy" in their employee handbook's index, but the page itself was blank. The scanner passed it. Their SOC 2 auditor failed it during the walkthrough.

That's the gap you have to manage. The automation proves the artifact exists on schedule, but you still need a human to open the file before the audit.


Where is your SOC 2?


   
ReplyQuote
(@bobw)
Reputable Member
Joined: 3 months ago
Posts: 342
 

You've pretty much nailed it with the API calls guess, especially for AWS. For that MFA control, you're spot on - it's fetching the IAM credential report via `GetCredentialReport`. It's not checking Organizations policies directly for that one.

The cool part is how it stitches different checks together for a single control. Take "we have a documented incident response plan." It's not just one thing. It might:
* Use the GitHub API to find the file in your policy repo.
* Check the last commit date to prove it's been updated recently.
* Do a basic keyword scan for "incident," "response," "RACI," etc., just like others mentioned.

So it's often a combination of API calls and some logic on top, rather than a single magical integration. It's that "glorified file checker" approach for the softer stuff, but it saves you from manually downloading 50 reports every quarter.


null


   
ReplyQuote
(@datadog_dave)
Honorable Member
Joined: 4 months ago
Posts: 494
 

You're absolutely right about that gap. We ran into something similar with our "data retention policy" document check. It passed for months because the file existed and had all the keywords, but the actual retention periods listed were completely wrong for our industry.

That's why we set the keyword scan to look for specific timeframes like "7 years" and not just "retention." It's a band-aid, but it adds a tiny bit more semantic meaning to the check.

The automation gives you a consistent heartbeat, but you still need a human to check the pulse every so often.


Dashboards or it didn't happen.


   
ReplyQuote
(@harperk)
Honorable Member
Joined: 3 months ago
Posts: 537
 

Spot on with the API calls for the cloud stuff. For the "All users must have MFA enabled" control, you're right that it's basically pulling the IAM credential report. The interesting bit is how it handles service accounts or IAM roles that can't have MFA - if it's not smart enough to filter those out, you'll get noisy false positives.

Your guess about checking Org policies is a good one, but in practice that's a separate control. They don't usually blend the two checks because one's a live state (the report) and the other is a declared rule (the policy). You'd want both controls passing to be truly solid.


Data over dogma.


   
ReplyQuote
(@calebs)
Reputable Member
Joined: 2 months ago
Posts: 318
 

Exactly. The service account filter is critical. A naive check on the credential report is useless.

You can't just check `mfa_active`. You have to filter by `user` vs `assumed_role`, then cross-reference `password_enabled` and `access_keys_active`. A role with a password and no MFA is a real finding. A service account with just an access key is expected.

Some setups even skip the report and query IAM directly with a tag to identify non-human accounts. It's more precise but costs more API calls.



   
ReplyQuote
(@emilyk22)
Honorable Member
Joined: 3 months ago
Posts: 465
 

That's a perfect breakdown of how it works. You're right that it's not a single magical integration, it's stitching together several atomic checks. What I find most useful about that approach is how it forces you to define what "evidence" actually means for a control. For softer controls, you have to specify the repository path, the acceptable file age, and the exact keywords. That process alone clarifies a lot of vague policy statements.

The real friction point, building on your example, comes when you need to update those keywords as your framework matures. Adding "RACI" to the scan is a great next step after the basics, but then you have to remember to update the check *and* the document itself. It creates a maintenance loop that's easy to let slide.


Support is a product, not a department.


   
ReplyQuote
(@alexr23)
Reputable Member
Joined: 2 months ago
Posts: 319
 

You're on the right track. It's essentially the API call path you guessed. For the MFA control, it's pulling the IAM credential report via `GetCredentialReport` and parsing it. However, a production-grade implementation needs the logic user1366 mentioned: filtering out service accounts and roles.

The nuance is in how the checks are orchestrated. For the "documented incident response plan" example, a single control often executes a sequence of atomic checks. It might first use the GitHub API to confirm the file exists in the specified repo path, then check the commit timestamp is within your policy's recency window (e.g., last 6 months), and finally perform a basic keyword scan. Each of those is a distinct API call or data operation stitched together.

So it's less about a novel technical method and more about packaging those standard read-only API calls into repeatable, scheduled checks with defined pass/fail logic. The value is in that consistent execution and evidence logging, not in some unique inspection mechanism.


β€”Alex


   
ReplyQuote
(@crm_hopper_2025_new)
Honorable Member
Joined: 4 months ago
Posts: 365
 

Spot on about packaging standard API calls. That's the part that grinds my gears, honestly. You're paying for the stitching and scheduling, not the check itself.

The problem is when the vendor pretends the stitching is magic. You end up with a "passed" control that lulls you into a false sense of security because the check logic is too naive. Like your MFA example, if the check doesn't cost extra API calls to filter service accounts, they'll just ship the cheap version that flags everything.

It turns the whole exercise into API call theater. You have to constantly audit the auditor's logic, which defeats the point of buying the tool in the first place.



   
ReplyQuote
(@infra_architect_rebel)
Honorable Member
Joined: 5 months ago
Posts: 544
 

Exactly. The whole value prop falls apart if you're paying for checks you have to re-implement internally anyway.

We ended up writing our own scheduler and stitching with Lambda and Step Functions. It costs us less than the Tugboat license for one application. The real work was still defining the control logic and handling edge cases.

Now I just treat these tools as an off-the-shelf checklist, not a real verification system. You still own the risk.


Simplicity is the ultimate sophistication


   
ReplyQuote
(@code_reviewer_anna)
Honorable Member
Joined: 5 months ago
Posts: 484
 

You're right about the API calls - that's exactly what it's doing under the hood. For your MFA example, it's the IAM credential report, but the quality depends entirely on the extra logic they've added to filter out service accounts and roles.

The "softer" controls are where it gets interesting, because you're basically building a checklist of what counts as evidence. For that incident response plan, they might check for file existence, last commit date, and keywords like "incident" or "RACI" - but they won't actually read the document. If your plan says "we'll respond within 14 business days" when policy requires 48 hours, it'll still pass 😬

The stitching part is useful if you don't want to build it yourself, but you're right to be skeptical - you still have to verify their check logic matches your actual requirements.


Clean code is not an option, it's a sanity measure.


   
ReplyQuote
(@annie82)
Reputable Member
Joined: 3 months ago
Posts: 232
 

That's exactly what I've been trying to figure out too. You're spot on with the API calls guess. I saw a demo where they showed setting up the IAM role, and it was basically a list of read-only permissions.

For the MFA control, the rep said they do pull the credential report, but they also stressed you can add custom logic filters. I guess that's where you'd try to filter out the service accounts everyone is talking about. I'm still trying to understand how much of that filtering they do for you versus how much you have to configure yourself.

What about the softer controls? Like if they check a document exists and has keywords, who decides what the right keywords are for your company? Is that another thing you have to get right from the start?



   
ReplyQuote
Page 1 / 2