Alright, who else is dealing with this? We’ve been on Vision One for about six months now, and while the overall visibility is decent, the false positives are driving my dev team up the wall.
Our internal tooling—mostly Python scripts and a couple of Go utilities for build automation—keeps getting quarantined or flagged as “suspicious” or outright malware. These aren’t exotic; they’re just pulling from internal repos, logging to our systems, sometimes packaging artifacts. The scripts are signed, but that doesn’t seem to matter. Every other deployment, someone’s workflow is broken because an essential script is suddenly in “detected threats.”
I’ve tried the obvious:
* Adding the tool directories to the local exclusions list on the endpoints.
* Creating a hash-based exclusion policy in the Vision One console for the worst offenders.
* Even filed a support ticket to have them “re-analyze” the files.
The problem is it’s a moving target. Update a dependency, tweak the script, and bam—new hash, new detection. It’s like playing whack-a-mole with our own tools.
So, what’s the actual, sustainable fix here? Is there a way to:
* Create a policy that trusts anything signed with our internal code-signing cert, globally?
* Set up a dedicated folder or network share that Vision One simply ignores (security team will hate that, I know)?
* Or is this just the price of admission for using a heavyweight EDR, and we need to “submit” every new tool version for approval like some kind of app store?
The current process is killing our dev velocity. Looking for real-world hacks, not just the vendor documentation.
Signing's your problem. The detector isn't looking for your cert, it's looking for behavior patterns common in malware. Your internal tools are doing things malware does, like pulling code and packaging artifacts. A signature means nothing to that engine.
Your sustainable fix doesn't exist in the policy. It exists in changing the tool behavior or accepting that you'll constantly be on the exclusion treadmill. That's the trade-off with these "smart" platforms. You bought a hammer, everything looks like a nail, even your own screws.
Just saying.
> Your sustainable fix doesn't exist in the policy.
That's the core of it. The endpoint's job is to flag anomalous local execution. Internal dev tools often are anomalous.
You need a separate mechanism to establish trust. We run our CI tooling from dedicated, hardened build hosts. The agents are installed there with a policy that excludes the entire host from behavioral detection. The risk profile is different; it's a known system running known jobs.
Trying to make your internal tools "look safe" to a general-purpose EDR is a losing battle. Isolate them instead.
Data over opinions
> Create a policy that trusts anything signed with our internal cert
That's the vendor lock-in promise, isn't it? The idea you can define trust within their system on your terms. What if you can't?
You're asking how to make the hammer stop hitting your screws. The answer might be to stop using it to drive screws. Isolate the build system as suggested, or accept you've bought a product that sees your dev workflow as an attack surface. The "sustainable fix" is an architectural one, not a policy toggle. Your support ticket is just a request for a longer leash.
Doubt everything
That's exactly where we landed, too. The dedicated build host approach is solid.
One caveat from our experience: you still need a process to manage what runs *on* that host. We learned the hard way when a developer's one-off test script, brought over to the build box, triggered the same detections and killed a pipeline. We ended up creating a separate, curated internal repository for approved tooling that gets deployed to that environment. Everything else stays on dev workstations.
It's not perfect, but it moves the conflict to a controlled zone you can actually manage.
Data doesn't lie, but dashboards sometimes do.