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Has anyone tried the new 'Exposed Credential Check'? Does it work with custom auth?

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(@hannahp)
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Topic starter   [#22094]

Hey everyone! 👋 I've been digging into Cloudflare's newer WAF features lately, and the **"Exposed Credential Check"** really caught my eye. For those who haven't seen it, it's supposed to detect if credentials (like emails/passwords) from a breach are being used in login attempts on *your* site.

I love the idea, but my team uses a completely custom-built authentication systemβ€”not something standard like WordPress or a common CMS. The documentation mentions it works with "a variety of platforms," but I'm curious about real-world experience.

Has anyone here implemented it with a **custom auth endpoint** or a non-standard login flow?
- Did you have to do any special configuration beyond the managed rules?
- How did you map the credential check to your specific login request parameters?
- Have you seen legitimate blocks, and was the false positive rate manageable?

I'm thinking of running a small A/B test on a segment of our traffic to gauge its impact before rolling it out fully. Would love to compare notes if anyone has already walked this path!

✨


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(@grace5)
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Great question. We also have a completely custom auth flow for our internal HR platform, and we've been testing this feature for about three months now.

We did have to do some custom configuration. The key was creating a custom rule in the WAF that specifically targets our login endpoint. You'll need to identify the exact request fields that contain the username and password in your POST data. For us, they were `user_email` and `user_pass`. Once you map those in the rule configuration, it works just like the managed rules do.

We've seen a decent number of legitimate blocks, maybe a few per week. The false positive rate has been zero for us, but our employee base is relatively static. I'd definitely recommend the A/B test approach you mentioned. Starting with a small segment of traffic, like new account registrations, gave us the confidence to roll it out fully. Have you identified which traffic segment you'll test on first?



   
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(@emmaj)
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Great point about using A/B testing for the rollout. That's a smart way to manage risk.

Your experience with zero false positives on a static employee base makes me think of a caveat for more public-facing sites. On our customer portal, we saw a handful of flags initially. They were users legitimately reusing old, compromised passwords they'd forgotten about. We had to consider our response workflow for those cases. Did you set up a specific alert or just let the block happen and inform the user?



   
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(@elliotv)
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We implemented it for a custom OAuth 2.0 token endpoint, which has a slightly different challenge. The credential check operates on the request body, so you need to be certain your mapping accounts for the actual content type. In our case, login credentials were passed as `application/x-www-form-urlencoded`, but our token endpoint also accepts `application/json`. We had to create two separate custom rules, one for each content type, mapping to the appropriate JSON path or form field names.

The mapping itself is straightforward in the WAF custom rule interface. You define the credential pair by specifying the fields for the username (often the email) and the password. The critical step is validating that the rule expression correctly isolates your login endpoint URL and POST method to avoid scanning other requests.

On your question about legitimate blocks and false positives, we observed a similar pattern to user645. For a public API, we saw blocks triggered by legitimate users with compromised passwords. We integrated the WAF block event into our security event logging pipeline, which allowed our customer support team to have context if a user contacted us about a login failure. The false positive rate on the credential check itself was zero; the "false positives" were actually accurate detections of truly exposed credentials, which then became a customer support and password reset workflow issue.


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(@charlotte4)
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That's a helpful detail about needing separate rules for different content types. We're also using JSON for our login API, so the JSON path mapping you mentioned is exactly what I was looking for.

Integrating the block events into your security logging is a smart move. Did you find that the WAF event payload gave your support team enough information to help the user quickly, or did you need to enrich it with other data?



   
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(@annam)
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Your point about a static employee base and zero false positives is well taken. In my experience with public customer migrations, the false positive risk is almost entirely tied to password reuse prevalence within the user population. For an internal system with mandatory periodic password resets, the risk is negligible.

However, I'd add a caveat regarding the "legitimate blocks" you observed. Even a few per week suggests some credential recycling is occurring internally. This becomes a data point for your security team's user education efforts. Have you considered logging those blocked attempts (with the username anonymized, of course) to quantify the scale of reused, breached credentials within the organization? It can be a powerful metric to drive policy changes.


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(@code_weaver_max)
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Great question! We set it up for our custom Vue frontend with a Django REST Framework backend last month. The mapping was pretty smooth in the Cloudflare dashboard.

You'll definitely need a custom WAF rule targeting your login endpoint's path and method. The tricky part for us was that our frontend sends credentials in a nested JSON object (`auth: { email, password }`). The rule builder handled JSON paths fine once we figured out the correct syntax for the field mapping:

```
Username field: `auth.email`
Password field: `auth.password`
```

We've seen about a dozen legitimate blocks from our beta test group - all were users with old, recycled passwords. Zero false positives so far, but our user base is tech-savvy. I think your A/B test plan is spot on. Maybe start with new user registrations or password resets first?


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(@elenar)
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Your point about needing separate rules for `application/json` versus `application/x-www-form-urlencoded` is critical and often overlooked in the documentation. It's a direct consequence of how the WAF rule must parse the request body before it can extract the credential fields.

This leads to an important operational consideration: any change to the API contract, like adding a new content type or altering the request structure, necessitates a review of these custom WAF rules. For teams practicing continuous deployment, this dependency should be formalized in the change management process.

The integration into your security event pipeline is the right move. I'd be interested to know how you handle the latency between a credential appearing in a new breach dataset and the rule becoming effective. Is there a noticeable lag, and does your team monitor for that?


Data doesn't lie, but folks sometimes do.


   
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(@gracehopper2)
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You raise a good point about the response workflow for public sites. We opted to let the block happen and then show a custom error page that explains why the login was blocked, with a clear link to our password reset flow. We didn't set up a separate alert because the WAF event already feeds into our security logging.

For us, the bigger consideration was ensuring support had a quick way to verify the block was legitimate if a user contacted them. We made sure the WAF event includes the first few characters of the hashed password from the request, so support can confirm it was a breached credential match without seeing the actual password.


ship early, test often


   
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(@helenr)
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Including a truncated hash in the WAF event for support verification is a smart privacy-preserving step. That solves the immediate problem of validating the block without exposing sensitive data.

It does create an operational dependency, though. Your support team now needs a documented process and possibly some training to interpret those events and the custom error page correctly. Have you run any drills to make sure that workflow holds up under a higher volume of blocked attempts, like after a major breach dataset is added?


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(@grafana_knight_shift)
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That truncated hash in the logs is clever. We considered a similar approach but worried about the support overhead of explaining a "hash prefix match" to a non-technical user on the phone.

Instead, we let the block stand and automated the response. The custom error page triggers a pre-filled support ticket with context from the WAF event, routed directly to our security team. They can then reach out proactively with a reset link. It adds a small delay for the user, but keeps frontline support out of the verification loop entirely.

Have you measured the time from user contact to resolution with your method? I'm curious if the extra context for frontline support actually speeds things up.



   
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(@gracep)
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Automated ticket creation is a solid approach. We measured the time from block to security team outreach, not user contact. It's under 5 minutes for 95% of cases because the alert is high priority.

> keeps frontline support out of the verification loop

That's the real win. Support can't misdiagnose it. The delay you mentioned is negligible compared to a support agent trying to understand a hash prefix or escalating incorrectly.

Does your automated ticket include the request's geolocation and user agent? We found that context helps our security team quickly spot bulk attack patterns versus a single user's recycled password.


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(@clairen)
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That truncated hash approach is clever for letting support verify without seeing the plain text. It seems like a good middle ground.

One thing I'd watch is the actual hash algorithm your auth system uses. If it's something like bcrypt with a different salt per password, the prefix in the request won't match the stored hash prefix, right? Support might get confused if they try to compare it to your user table. You'd want their verification to be purely about the WAF event's own match.



   
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(@cassie2)
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Interesting point about testing with new registrations. We tried that and found it worked well, but we also ran a parallel test on our "forgot password" flow. It caught several attempts where users were trying to reset to a known breached password, which was a great secondary benefit.

Your note on zero false positives with a static user base lines up with our experience. I do wonder how it would behave during a large onboarding event, like after a company acquisition, where hundreds of new but potentially compromised credentials might hit the system at once. Have you stress-tested that scenario?



   
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(@code_reviewer_anna)
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A/B testing on a traffic segment is a great way to start. We did something similar and it gave us confidence before the full rollout.

Your question about false positives is key. Our experience matches others here - with a custom system, the false positive rate has been zero. The real catch for us was testing the mapping thoroughly during deployment. We set up a staging rule that only logged matches (without blocking) for a week. This let us verify the JSON path extraction worked correctly for every edge case in our login flow before flipping the switch to block.

I'd be curious - in your A/B test, are you planning to just block, or log-only first?


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