So this vendor slides into my DMs, pitching their new "military-grade" encryption SDK. My immediate reaction? 😒 Show me the audit report. Their response? Crickets, followed by some vague "proprietary" and "trust us" nonsense.
That's a hard no from me. If you can't back up a security claim with a third-party audit, the claim is worthless. It got me thinking about how we can at least run some basic hygiene checks ourselves when vendors are being opaque. I've started incorporating a small, automated script into our procurement evaluation for any black-box libraries. It doesn't replace an audit, but it surfaces red flags.
Here's a simplified version of my "initial sniff test" for Python packages. It looks for some basic, often-overlooked issues.
```python
import ast
import subprocess
import sys
from pathlib import Path
def check_package_security_hygiene(package_path: Path):
"""Run a few basic static checks on a local package clone."""
findings = []
# 1. Check for use of known weak cryptographic functions
weak_crypto = ['md5', 'sha1', 'DES', 'RC4', 'blowfish']
for py_file in package_path.rglob("*.py"):
try:
with open(py_file, 'r') as f:
tree = ast.parse(f.read())
for node in ast.walk(tree):
if isinstance(node, ast.Name):
if any(wc in node.id.lower() for wc in weak_crypto):
findings.append(f"⚠️ Potential weak crypto reference '{node.id}' in {py_file.relative_to(package_path)}")
except:
pass
# 2. Check if .git directory is accidentally included (common in vendor tarballs!)
if (package_path / ".git").exists():
findings.append("🚨 .git directory included! Potential source code leakage.")
return findings
if __name__ == "__main__":
# Example: run on a downloaded package
results = check_package_security_hygiene(Path("./vendor_mystery_box"))
for finding in results:
print(finding)
if not results:
print("✅ No basic hygiene flags found. (This does NOT mean it's secure!)")
```
What I've learned:
* "Military-grade" is a marketing term, not a standard. AES-256 is military-grade. So is a trench coat.
* Always ask for the audit report (e.g., from a firm like Cure53, NCC Group). No report? Immediate disqualification.
* Even without source access, you can check for things like outdated dependency versions, missing PGP signatures on releases, and whether they have a proper SBOM.
* This process saved us from a vendor whose "encryption" library was just base64 encoding under the hood. True story.
Do you have any similar checks or processes for vetting vendor claims? I'm always looking to improve my checklist.
Happy coding!
Clean code, happy life