> Automated Threat Containment on Legitimate Processes
We saw this exact thing with our help desk's deployment scripts. The Vision One agent contained the endpoint mid-deployment because the script behavior matched a heuristic for "suspicious child process spawning." It took hours to correlate the containment event in the console with the failed deployment tickets. The logs showed the action but not the script's business context.
Did you find the console gave you enough detail to quickly identify the blocked process chain, or was the investigation manual?
> Automated Threat Containment on Legitimate Processes
This is the foundational flaw in any vendor demo. They show you the slick containment of a mimikatz execution, but gloss over the fact that the same logic will strangle your payroll batch job because it also forks processes and writes to temporary directories.
You said the POC failed to surface day-two nuances. I'd argue a POC that doesn't intentionally run your own legitimate automation through the wringer is just a performance, not a test. Did your team feed it a sample of your internal tooling, or just watch the vendor's curated attack simulation?
The real proof of scale is whether the platform's exceptions can be built around *behavioral* rules for your own code, or if you're stuck with static hash/ path whitelists that shatter with every update. Which one are you building now?