I'm currently evaluating Trend Micro Vision One for a multi-cloud deployment (AWS & Azure) and have hit a significant roadblock in its role-based access control (RBAC) model. My organization operates on a principle of least privilege, requiring us to scope administrative capabilities very granularly—for instance, we need a security analyst who can only view and acknowledge alerts for a specific set of AWS accounts, but cannot touch any Azure resources or access any policy configuration menus.
From my analysis of the Vision One "Administrative Roles" and "Custom Roles" interfaces, the scoping mechanisms appear contradictory or, at best, poorly documented. The platform seems to conflate **resource scope** (which workloads/data sources a role applies to) with **functional scope** (which UI modules and API endpoints the role can access). I've attempted to construct a role using the JSON template available in the API documentation, but the inheritance model between built-in roles and custom roles is unclear.
Here is a simplified example of the kind of structure I'm trying to achieve, based on API snippets:
```json
{
"roleName": "Tier1-Analyst-WorkloadA",
"permissions": [
"alert.manage",
"workbench.view"
],
"resourceConstraints": [
{
"entityType": "awsAccount",
"constraintType": "inclusion",
"values": ["123456789012", "234567890123"]
}
],
"moduleRestrictions": [
{
"module": "policyManagement",
"access": "deny"
},
{
"module": "responseActions",
"access": "deny"
}
]
}
```
My specific issues are:
* **Scope Inconsistency:** When I apply a resource constraint based on AWS account IDs, it correctly filters the visible alerts in the Workbench. However, the same user, when accessing the "Data Sources" page, can still see the *configuration* of all connected accounts (Azure tenants, other AWS accounts), even if they cannot add or remove them. This is a security finding leakage we cannot accept.
* **API vs UI Discrepancy:** The permissions granted via a custom role seem to apply uniformly to the UI and the API. We require a scenario where a service account via API can perform actions across all resources, while human users in the UI are scoped. I see no way to decouple these.
* **Missing Negative Permissions:** The model lacks an explicit "deny" capability for specific, sensitive functions within an otherwise permitted category (e.g., allowing all `alert.manage` actions except for "request file analysis").
Has anyone successfully implemented a segmented administrative model in Vision One that holds up under a strict compliance framework like ISO 27001 or SOC 2? I am particularly interested in real-world examples of JSON role definitions or any workarounds involving attribute-based access control (ABAC) that you might have employed.
Our alternative is to maintain separate Vision One tenants for each business unit, which would drastically increase cost and operational overhead. Any detailed insights or references to obscure documentation would be greatly appreciated.
I've been trying to get my head around the RBAC in our new dashboard at work, and this specific conflict between **resource scope** and **functional scope** rings a bell, even in a totally different system. It feels like the platform designers sometimes assume you'll want to control everything for a resource group, or nothing at all.
When you mention the inheritance model being unclear between built-in and custom roles, is that because the built-in ones have hidden, hard-coded permissions that override your custom settings? That's what we ran into. Our "Viewer" role had some inexplicable edit rights on one specific tab.
Yes, that's exactly it. Built-in roles often have implicit entitlements tied to their name, not the visible permission set. It creates a conflict layer that isn't documented.
Your example with the Viewer role having edit rights is classic. I've seen this where a role's functional scope is defined by the UI tab's own permission mapping, which overrides the role's resource scope. The tab was probably flagged globally as 'read-write' for any role with access.
You can't fix it without a support ticket. Their backend logic is overriding your UI settings.
Five nines? Prove it.
You hit the nail on the head with the UI tab's own permission mapping overriding everything. I've run into that exact pattern in other enterprise platforms, not just security ones. The backend team builds a page and slaps a single permission flag on the whole route, like 'workloads:write', and calls it a day.
Then the UI reads that flag and decides if your role gets a read-only view or full edit buttons, completely ignoring any resource scopes you set up. The maddening part is you can sometimes see the discrepancy in the network tab when the UI fetches its own permission manifest.
Your only real option is to reverse-engineer the effective permissions through trial and error, document the gaps, and use that as ammunition for the support ticket. Without that evidence, they'll just tell you it's working as designed.
Automate everything. Twice.