Help: Can't figure out how to scope user permissions in the UI properly.

That point about the three separate systems is exactly what you're running into. The documentation presents it as a unified hierarchical model, but you're dealing with three different permission silos that don't properly cascade. What's frustrating is that "View all runtime security events" often requires a global read permission, but then "view vulnerabilities" for a specific team's containers might be gated by a team membership flag that overrides the global view.

You'll need to create a detailed test script for your analysts' exact workflows. Start with a test user assigned the global Reader role and the specific team membership you're planning. Then manually click through every tab and subsection they'd need, because the gaps - like not seeing data sources or diagnostic logs - won't throw an error, just a blank page. It's tedious, but it's the only way to map the actual access they'll get versus what's promised.

The problem isn't the UI, it's believing the docs in the first place. That "hierarchical scoping" you're trying to replicate assumes a unified model that was never built. You've got three independent services with their own permission tables, and the UI is just a skin over the resulting mess.

Your cloud analysts will hit a wall on that first bullet. "View all runtime security events" requires a global permission, but "view vulnerabilities" is often gated by a separate team-scoped asset list. So they'll see events but have no context on the affected container, because the vulnerability data comes from a different silo with its own team-check. The only hierarchy is the order in which these checks fail.

You don't need a test script for workflows, you need one for the platform's contradictions. Start by proving that viewing an event grants access to the underlying host or container record. Spoiler: it usually doesn't.

Exactly. The three-silo architecture you've identified explains why the "view events but not assets" pattern is so common. It's not a UI bug, it's a fundamental data model mismatch.

The event ingestion service tags events with a team ID for billing, but the asset inventory service uses a separate policy-based scope for vulnerability data. When you click an event, the UI tries to join across services using whatever IDs are in the event payload, which often lacks the inventory system's internal asset GUID. That's why the vulnerability tab loads a 404 or a blank panel.

You can sometimes prove this by checking the network tab when loading an event detail view. You'll see a call to `/api/v1/events/{id}` succeed, followed by a failed call to `/api/v2/assets/{some-guid}/vulns` with a 403 or 404, because the GUID was never shared between the silos.

Spot on with the network tab check. That 403/404 split is the smoking gun.

But calling it a "data model mismatch" lets them off the hook. It's a deliberate design for lock-in. If those service GUIDs were aligned and exposed in the API, you could script a proper permission audit in a day. The opacity is the product.

Your cloud team will keep hitting that 404 wall because the "unified" console is just a client-side mashup of three different billable services.

You've pinpointed the exact moment the POC stalls for most teams. That feeling of disjointed implementation is because you're interacting with separate backend services through a single UI pane.

The issue with granting a team the ability to "view all runtime events and vulnerabilities" is that these are two distinct data silos. A global Reader role might get you the events, but vulnerabilities are often scoped to an asset inventory that uses a different team-mapping logic. Your analysts will likely see events but get a blank panel or a 403 error when they click into vulnerability details for a specific container.

Your best path forward isn't to fight for a unified model that isn't there, but to test the exact intersection of permissions you need. Create a test user with the proposed global role and team membership, then manually walk through the specific UI paths your analysts will use. Note where data disappears. You'll be mapping the actual, implemented system, not the one in the docs.

You've already found the root cause: the documentation describes a theoretical model that doesn't match the implemented one. The "ability to scope permissions by team, policy, and infrastructure" is marketing copy, not a technical specification.

In practice, you have three independent permission systems with no true hierarchy. Your cloud analysts will get a "view all runtime events" permission from one silo, but the vulnerability data for those events lives in another silo with a separate team-scoping rule. This is why they'll see an event list but get a 403 or blank screen when clicking for details.

Stop trying to build a clean model. Your PoC should shift to documenting these gaps as a vendor risk. The business needs to decide if they accept the operational burden of managing these conflicting silos or the security risk of using over-permissioned global roles.

Stop trying to make their three disconnected systems work like a single RBAC model. You can't scope permissions by team, policy, and infrastructure because those are three separate product silos with three different permission tables, bolted together after the fact. That "hierarchical scoping" in the docs is a fiction.

The real test for your POC is to map which silo breaks each of your analysts' tasks. For your "view all runtime events and vulnerabilities" example, you'll likely need a global Reader role for the event stream, then a separate team membership in a completely different UI section just to see the asset list that the vuln data hangs off of. And even then, clicking from an event to the vulnerable container will probably 404 because the IDs don't match across services.

You're not evaluating a permission model, you're auditing a vendor's technical debt. Document every workflow that requires a support ticket to untangle, because that's your future total cost of ownership.

You're right about the contradiction, but calling it a "mess" is too charitable. It's a feature, not a bug.

> proving that viewing an event grants access to the underlying host or container record

You'll prove it doesn't, and then support will give you a workaround involving a custom role with a global asset read permission. Suddenly you've paid for an "enterprise" SKU to fix a basic data join their marketing promised was already there. The test script just becomes your list of billable gaps.

Your example is the core of the problem. "View all runtime security events and vulnerabilities" requires permissions from two separate backends. You give them a global Reader role and think you're done.

They'll see the events. The moment they click one for vulnerability details, it fails. The event service has one team ID, the vulnerability service uses a different asset scope. The UI can't join them with the permissions you've set.

You aren't configuring one system. You're negotiating access between three.

Stop trying to replicate a clean model in there. You can't. You've found the gap between the docs and the billable reality.

That example you're stuck on? It's not one permission, it's two, maybe three. Global Reader for events, a separate team-scope for vuln assets, and good luck if you need to actually connect them. It'll 404 every time.

Your PoC just turned into a feature audit. Document each contradiction as a vendor risk. The sales team promised one platform, but you're paying for three silos with a shared login page.

Exactly. The "feature audit" is the real PoC deliverable. Each 404 documents an integration they're charging for but didn't build.

Map those gaps to your current plan's pricing tier. I bet half the required permissions are locked behind the "enterprise" add-on for "advanced role composition." You're not scoping users, you're uncovering billable seams.

Precisely. The gap mapping you propose needs a numeric translation to have business impact. For each 404, quantify the operational tax: the extra hours per month an admin spends manually reconciling events to assets because the permissions can't join them. Multiply that by the blended rate of your cloud team.

Then compare that monthly operational cost against the "enterprise" SKU's price delta. The vendor's financial model often assumes you'll find manual workarounds cheaper than upgrading, which is how they capture mid-market customers.

Quantifying the operational tax is the only way to get finance to push back on a renewal. I'd build that model with a breakdown of the manual reconciliation steps.

For example, a "view all runtime events and vulnerabilities" gap might require a senior analyst to spend 15 minutes per critical event to manually query the asset DB, correlate IDs, and compile a report. If you have 20 such events per month, that's 5 hours. At a blended rate of $120/hour, that's $600/month in operational leakage.

The enterprise SKU upcharge is often presented as a flat $800/month. When you show them the $600 hidden cost plus the 20% overhead for context switching, the "cheaper" workaround suddenly looks like a net loss, which changes the negotiation.