We have recently completed a full deployment of Prisma Access across our hybrid workforce and are in the process of fine-tuning the SSL decryption policies to meet our internal ISO 27001 control requirements for data-in-transit inspection. As expected, we are encountering significant breakage with several business-critical SaaS applications. The standard approach of creating decryption exclusion rules based on URL categories or domains is proving insufficient due to the dynamic nature of these platforms.
The primary applications causing disruption are:
* A major CRM platform where dynamic content delivery networks (CDNs) and third-party service integrations fail, breaking core workflows.
* A cloud-based HR management system that utilizes certificate pinning, resulting in complete connection failures for employee self-service portals.
* Several financial and analytics tools that employ non-standard TLS implementations or specific ALPN protocols that our current decryption profile appears to intercept incorrectly.
Our current exclusion methodology relies on a static list of FQDNs, but this is not sustainable. We are considering a more nuanced policy framework and are keen to understand the community's operational best practices.
Specifically, I am seeking detailed feedback on the following points:
* What is your structured process for identifying and vetting applications for SSL decryption exclusion? Do you employ specific traffic logs or threat forensics beyond the standard decryption logs?
* For applications using certificate pinning or dynamic CDNs, do you find success with excluding based on a combination of URL category (e.g., "saas-business") *and* specific user groups, or is a more granular fingerprinting approach required?
* How do you document and justify these exclusions within your compliance frameworks (e.g., SOC 2 or ISO 27001) to auditors who scrutinize blanket security bypasses? What compensating controls do you typically implement?
* Have you leveraged Prisma Access's own SaaS Security module or integration with Cortex Data Lake queries to build a more intelligent, risk-based exclusion list?
I am particularly interested in any formalized workflow or decision tree your organization uses to balance security posture with operational continuity.
—at
Dynamic domain lists are a losing battle. You need to exclude by SNI from the firewall, not by destination IP or a static FQDN list. Your HR system with cert pinning will never work with decryption, just exclude it.
For the CRM and analytics tools, you're likely breaking due to TLS 1.3 or specific cipher suites. Create a no-decryption policy for those URL categories, but also check your decryption profile settings. Disabling session resumption can sometimes help, but you trade performance.
The real answer is to move your exclusions to an allow-list model. Decrypt everything *except* specific categories/apps. It's the only way to manage it at scale. Your ISO auditors need to understand that inspecting pinned traffic is technically impossible without breaking it.
slow pipelines make me cranky
Yeah, that static FQDN list is gonna burn you out. I've been there. For the CRM with dynamic CDNs, you can sometimes cheat by excluding the primary login/API domain and then letting everything else ride, but you're right, it's brittle.
For the stuff with certificate pinning, like your HR system, you just have to exclude it. Full stop. No amount of tweaking profiles will fix it. I usually create a rule for the specific URL category or a dedicated custom URL category that catches the main app domain and its known service subdomains. It's not perfect, but it's easier to maintain than a thousand FQDNs.
The financial/analytics tools are tricky. Those non-standard TLS or ALPN issues often require a decryption profile that's less strict, maybe with a specific SSL protocol setting or by disabling certain inspection features. You might have to experiment with a separate profile just for that traffic category.
ship it
Sorry to jump in, but I'm facing a similar issue on a smaller scale with Google Sheets and some add-ons. When you say the static FQDN list isn't sustainable, is it because the list just gets too long to manage, or because new domains keep popping up that you miss? I'm trying to understand what 'not sustainable' actually looks like in practice.
Both, but the second problem is the real killer. It's not just list length, though that becomes a maintenance burden. The critical issue is the constant emergence of new, unexpected domains. A SaaS app might spin up a new service on a different CDN, integrate a fresh third-party widget, or shift API endpoints. Each new domain is a potential break until you discover it and update your static list, which is a reactive and frustrating cycle for both IT and end-users.
In the context of Google Workspace, you might exclude `docs.google.com` and `sheets.google.com`, but an add-on could call out to a completely separate domain for processing or data. That's the domain you'll miss until a user reports that a specific function is broken. This reactive mode is what makes it unsustainable for dynamic platforms.
The move towards exclusion by SNI, as mentioned earlier, or using a dedicated URL category for the core application can help by casting a wider net, but it's about shifting from managing individual domains to managing application behaviors.
Let's keep it constructive