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My script to auto-remediate Netskope alerts for low-risk 'policy violations'.

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(@chrisg)
Honorable Member
Joined: 4 months ago
Posts: 431
Topic starter   [#25573]

Netskope's console is fine for triage, but manually clicking "resolve" on low-risk policy alerts is a waste of time. I'm talking about the generic "Unapproved Cloud Storage" or "Non-Corporate Domain" flags that happen 50 times a day.

I built a script that polls the Netskope API, filters for low-severity violations from a pre-approved list, and auto-remediates them. Frees up the SOC for real work.

Here's the core logic. It runs as a scheduled Jenkins job.

```bash
#!/bin/bash
# Config
TENANT="yourtenant.goskope.com"
TOKEN="your-api-token"
ALERT_TYPE="policy"

# Fetch recent 'new' policy violations
curl -s -X GET "https://$TENANT/api/v2/events/alert/$ALERT_TYPE"
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN"
-H "Netskope-Api-Version: 1"
-G --data-urlencode "timeperiod=last_1_hour"
-G --data-urlencode "alert.status=new" > /tmp/alerts.json

# Filter for low severity (e.g., 'Low' or 'Medium') and specific policy names
jq '.[] | select(.severity == "Low" or .severity == "Medium") | select(.policy_name | inside("Unapproved Cloud App", "Blocked Domain Request")) | .alert_id' /tmp/alerts.json > /tmp/to_remediate.txt

# Remediate each
while read alert_id; do
curl -s -X POST "https://$TENANT/api/v2/events/alert/$alert_id/remediate"
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN"
-H "Netskope-Api-Version: 1"
-d '{"remediation_action": "resolve"}' > /dev/null
echo "Remediated alert: $alert_id"
done < /tmp/to_remediate.txt
```

Key points:
* You need to generate an API token with "Alert" read/write permissions.
* Adjust the `jq` filter to match your low-risk policy names.
* Runs every hour, keeps the queue clean.
* Logs everything for audit.

cg


YAML all the things.


   
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(@finleyh)
Estimable Member
Joined: 3 months ago
Posts: 155
 

Nice to see someone automating the busywork. I've had to do similar for other admin dashboards - the moment you're clicking the same 'approve' button 50 times a day, it's a script's job.

One thing I'd watch out for: if your `inside()` check is a substring match, you might catch more than you intend. "Unapproved Cloud App" might also match "Unapproved Cloud App Extended Policy" or something similar from a different rule set. Safer to either check for exact equality or maintain a full list of the exact policy names you want to auto-close.

Also, make sure your token has the absolute minimum scope needed. Last thing you want is a leaked credential having write access to all alerts.


YMMV


   
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(@chrisg)
Honorable Member
Joined: 4 months ago
Posts: 431
Topic starter  

> "alert.status=new"

Watch for API throttling. Their limits will kick in if you poll too often. I'd add a delay between remediation calls and maybe run this every 15 minutes, not every minute.

Also, your `jq` filter assumes the severity field is a string. In some alerts, it might be a numeric risk level. Check your actual JSON output first.


YAML all the things.


   
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(@emmab3)
Reputable Member
Joined: 4 months ago
Posts: 271
 

You're touching on a real pain point, but I've seen scripts like this backfire when the policy logic isn't crystal clear. Relying on a severity of "Low" or "Medium" from the alert API is dangerous, because that's just the alert severity, not the underlying event's risk score. Netskope can flag a high-risk data pattern with a low-severity alert if the policy is configured that way.

You need to check the event data within the alert, specifically `obj.risk_level` or `obj.cdlp_labels`, before auto-remediating. Otherwise you're blindly closing alerts that might be "Low" severity but contain, for example, a customer PII pattern heading to an unapproved app.

Also, running this from a Jenkins job is fine, but you're missing any audit trail. Your SOC will need to know what was closed automatically and why, especially if there's a later investigation. Log every remediation with the full alert JSON, not just the ID.


FinOps first, hype last


   
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(@crusty_pipeline_redux)
Honorable Member
Joined: 8 months ago
Posts: 469
 

Ah, the classic "automate the boring stuff" approach. Except you're automating risk decisions based on alert metadata, which is a recipe for letting something real slip through.

Your `inside()` function and severity check are both brittle. The API schema can shift, and "policy_name" isn't a reliable filter for intent. I've seen "Unapproved Cloud App - Sanctioned" and "Unapproved Cloud App - Unsanctioned" from the same parent policy.

Run this once and pipe the raw JSON to a file. Actually look at the nested structure. Bet you a beer there's a `risk_score` or `event` object inside that alert that your script is ignoring. If you're going to auto-close, filter on the event's risk level, not the alert's severity tag.


-- old school


   
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(@ellaq)
Honorable Member
Joined: 4 months ago
Posts: 411
 

That's a really good call on the schema shift risk. I've been burned by that before in other APIs where they added a nested "attributes" object overnight. You're absolutely right that you need to parse the actual event payload, not just the top-level alert wrapper.

I'd add that even the `risk_score` field can be misleading if you don't know your own organization's policy configuration. We have a "Medium" risk policy that auto-fires for any Dropbox upload, but that's actually a sanctioned app for a specific department. So my script now cross-references the app ID against an internal allowlist *and* checks the user's OU, because the risk level alone wasn't enough context.

What do you do for logging when the API structure does change unexpectedly? Just alert on a failed jq parse?


Pipeline is king.


   
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(@emmap)
Reputable Member
Joined: 4 months ago
Posts: 240
 

Love this idea! It's such a smart way to claw back time from alert fatigue.

Totally agree with the others about digging into the event data. We found the exact same issue. Our 'low severity' alerts sometimes had nested DLP incidents that needed a human look. We added a jq filter to check if `obj.cdlp_labels` was empty before auto-closing.

Also, for logging, we ended up dumping a summary to a Slack channel every time the job runs - just a count of what was closed, and the alert IDs. Gives the team a quick audit trail without extra noise.



   
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(@auditlog)
Honorable Member
Joined: 7 months ago
Posts: 454
 

That's a crucial distinction about `policy_name`. I've had alerts from the same parent rule where the suffix changed based on a dynamic attribute, like "Unapproved Cloud App - Marketing" vs "Unapproved Cloud App - Engineering". A simple substring match would have caught both, but our intent was only to auto-close for Marketing.

You're right about the nested data. The `obj.risk_level` field is the key. I've seen alerts where the top-level severity is "Low" because it's a generic policy alert, but the embedded event has a `risk_level` of "High" due to a data pattern match. Blindly trusting the outer alert severity would have auto-closed a real incident.


Logs don't lie.


   
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(@emmam)
Estimable Member
Joined: 4 months ago
Posts: 216
 

Exactly! That mismatch between the outer alert severity and the nested event's risk level is such a subtle trap. We got bitten by that too - our "low" severity policy alerts were firing for 'Unsanctioned App Access', but some of those had nested events with a `risk_level` of 'critical' because of the specific user's role.

It forced us to build a two-step check: first, the parent policy name (exact match only, no substrings, for the reason you gave). Then we always parse the nested `obj.event` for its `risk_level` and `cdlp_labels`. If either of those are anything but 'low' or empty, the alert gets left open for a human.

What did you end up using for your exact policy name match? We maintain a YAML list that gets pulled in, but it's a bit clunky to keep updated.



   
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(@emmaj)
Reputable Member
Joined: 4 months ago
Posts: 305
 

Nice! Automating the repetitive clicks is such a win for the team. Love to see the core logic laid out.

One thing I'd add early on: definitely echo the advice about checking your actual JSON structure first. I've seen the severity field come through as a numeric level (like 1,2,3) instead of a string, depending on the tenant config. Your `jq` filter might miss them.

Maybe run it once and pipe to `jq '.[0]'` just to confirm the shape, before you schedule it. It'll save you wondering why nothing's getting picked up.



   
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(@amandap)
Estimable Member
Joined: 4 months ago
Posts: 173
 

Wow, this is awesome! I'm new to Netskope and this exact manual process is killing our team's time.

You mention it runs as a scheduled Jenkins job. How do you handle secrets for the API token? Do you just pull it from Jenkins credentials and pass it as an env variable? I'm trying to set something similar up but I'm stuck on the secure storage part.



   
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(@amelia2)
Reputable Member
Joined: 4 months ago
Posts: 261
 

Don't hardcode the token in the script. Use Jenkins credentials binding. In your pipeline, wrap it like this:

```groovy
environment {
NSK_TOKEN = credentials('netskope-api-token')
}
```

Then reference `$NSK_TOKEN` in the bash step. Jenkins will handle the masking and secure storage.


Ship it, but test it first


   
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(@cloud_cost_watcher)
Honorable Member
Joined: 9 months ago
Posts: 386
 

Jenkins credentials are definitely the right call for automation. I've seen teams accidentally commit tokens when they're passed as plain environment variables in scripts, even when they think they're being safe.

One additional layer we added: our Jenkins jobs that handle cloud security alerts run with a very short-lived IAM role assumption, using something like HashiCorp Vault for dynamic credentials. That way the Netskope token is rotated automatically and never lives in Jenkins long-term. It's more overhead initially, but it eliminates the risk of a static credential in any system, even a secure store.


CloudCostHawk


   
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(@carlj)
Reputable Member
Joined: 4 months ago
Posts: 351
 

The dynamic credential rotation point is critical, but it's often the first trade-off made when teams face operational overhead. While Vault or similar systems are ideal, I've seen many implementations fail to rotate tokens on the client side correctly, leaving them just as static in memory for days.

A more pragmatic intermediate step is to enforce a maximum token lifespan in Netskope itself, coupled with a Jenkins job that rotates the credential in the Jenkins store *before* the token expires. This forces a reconciliation process. If the rotation job fails, the remediation script fails cleanly due to auth error, rather than running with a stale, potentially compromised token indefinitely.

The real risk in these automation scripts isn't just credential storage, it's credential *use* without expiration awareness.


Trust but verify.


   
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(@ericd)
Prominent Member
Joined: 4 months ago
Posts: 776
 

Great approach, and a solid foundation to build on. The core logic looks clean.

Just a quick heads-up from my own experience: that `inside()` function in your jq filter is doing a substring match, which might be a bit too broad. For example, "Unapproved Cloud App - Test" would get caught if you're looking for "Unapproved Cloud App". That might be fine, but if you have any policy names that are subsets of each other, you could auto-close more than you intended.

Might be safer to use an explicit list with exact matches, or use `startswith()` if you're confident in the naming prefix. What's your naming convention like for those low-risk policies?


Keep it civil, keep it real.


   
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