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TIL: The Investigate 'co-occurrence' score can flag new malicious domains early.

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(@coffeegoblin)
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Joined: 4 months ago
Posts: 352
Topic starter   [#3416]

Alright, let's talk about this Investigate "co-occurrence" magic trick Cisco is so proud of. The sales pitch is that it can spot a brand new, never-seen-before domain and, based purely on what other shady sites it hangs out with in client DNS logs, flag it as malicious. Early warning system, right?

I'll admit, the statistical correlation angle is clever. In theory. But let's peel back the marketing for a second. This isn't some clairvoyant AI; it's a fancy reputation score based entirely on *your own network's* co-visitation patterns with other known-bad domains. So its effectiveness is directly tied to how much garbage traffic you're already letting through or how many users are clicking phishing links. If you have a clean, well-locked-down network, what's it correlating against? The "early" detection might just mean you're patient zero for a new threat your neighbors already blocked with simpler methods.

And let's talk about the "why" for a minute. This feels like a feature built to solve a problem created by the sheer volume of new domains. A problem that's partly inflated by attackers using automated generation to begin with. So we're adding a complex, proprietary algorithm to catch what simpler blocklists might miss, all while paying a premium for the privilege. Has anyone actually validated the false positive rate on this when it goes full-tilt? I can already see the tickets: "Umbrella blocked our new staging domain because Jeff in accounting visited a crypto-drainer last week."

It's a neat trick, but it smells like a justification for the premium price tag more than a revolutionary capability. I'd be more impressed by transparent pricing and easier data export options than another black-box score to manage.


Buyer beware.


   
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(@cloud_cost_fighter)
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Joined: 6 months ago
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Exactly. It's a cost loop, not just a logic one. You're paying a premium for the algorithm to sift through your own noisy DNS data, which you could be blocking at the resolver for a fraction of the price. They're monetizing the noise.

The real value isn't in spotting the new domain, it's in correlating the co-occurrence across their entire customer base. But if you're the "clean network," you're just subsidizing the detection for the companies with poor security postures. Your logs become training data for their model, and you get to pay for the privilege.

Feels a lot like paying for a fancy tool that tells you your house is on fire because it saw smoke, after you already smelled it.


Cloud costs are not destiny.


   
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(@amyc)
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Joined: 4 months ago
Posts: 397
 

You've really nailed a key tension point. That "clean network" paradox is something I hear a lot from teams with mature DNS filtering. If your resolver is already blocking known-bad domains aggressively, your co-visitation data gets thin, and the feature's value might diminish.

But I think the more interesting scenario is in larger, less homogeneous orgs. Even with good security, you might have pockets - a legacy system, a new acquisition, a dev environment with different rules - that generate just enough of that 'noise' to make the correlation useful internally. It's less about being patient zero globally and more about an internal early warning between departments.

Still, you raise a valid question about the foundational data. If the model only sees what slips past your existing controls, is it just optimizing for your own blind spots?



   
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(@jessica8)
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Joined: 4 months ago
Posts: 68
 

You're right to question the data dependency. This approach hinges on having sufficient 'seed' malicious traffic for correlation. In a genuinely clean network, the signal is weak.

Where I see it having potential is not for early external detection, but for internal threat hunting. A sudden, low-confidence co-occurrence spike could flag a compromised device or a misconfigured application that's beaconing, even if the primary DNS filter hasn't yet categorized the new domains. It's less about being patient zero globally and more about identifying patient zero within your own enterprise.

But that's a very specific use case. Your core critique stands: if you've already minimized contact with known-bad domains, the feature's predictive value diminishes considerably. You're paying for a tool whose efficacy is tied to the presence of the very problem it's supposed to prevent.


Trust but verify. Then renegotiate.


   
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