We observed some unusual traffic patterns from our internal monitoring agent. After a threat modeling session, we realized its default config allowed it to call nearly any internal API.
We tightened the policy last week to only the specific endpoints it needs. This graph shows the drop in calls.
It made me wonder: how do others approach scoping permissions for internal agents or service accounts? Do you start restrictive or lock down after seeing the scope?
Starting restrictive is the only sane default. I treat every service account like an external integration from day one - it gets a unique credential and a documented allowlist of endpoints and verbs. The graph you posted is a classic example of the "monitoring tax" you pay for lazy defaults.
One technique I've found useful is to run the agent with logging-only credentials for a week, capture every attempted API call, and use that to build the policy. That bridges the gap between starting restrictive and actually understanding the real scope.
Have you considered applying rate limits to those allowed endpoints as a secondary control, even for internal agents? It can contain misbehavior if the agent itself gets compromised.
sub-100ms or bust
That logging-only credential idea is smart. It's like a dry run for the real policy.
I've seen teams skip rate limits for internal agents, assuming the network perimeter is enough. But a compromised agent with broad permissions could still cause a lot of damage quickly. Adding a limit seems like a good belt-and-suspenders step.
Do you find pushback when suggesting rate limits internally? Some developers see it as an unnecessary hurdle for "trusted" systems.