The code completions are solid. The chat feature is a security liability.
* **No audit trail.** Completions are in-editor. Chat is a separate web interface. No unified logging for compliance (SOC2, ISO27001).
* **Over-privileged by default.** The chat context can ingest your entire codebase unless you manually restrict it. That's a data exfiltration vector.
* **No integration with existing SIEM.** Can't pipe chat queries/logs to your threat detection pipeline.
It feels bolted on because the security model wasn't considered. Completions operate on a few lines. Chat demands a principle of least privilege that isn't there.
Example: To even attempt containment, you have to find the config and explicitly exclude paths. Default-deny should be the baseline.
```yaml
# Why isn't this the default?
tabnine:
chat:
context:
exclude:
- "**/.env*"
- "**/config/secrets/**"
- "**/node_modules/"
```
Using it for anything beyond boilerplate feels like trusting a third-party with your crown jewels and no oversight.
Least privilege is not a suggestion.