You stopped typing right at the most interesting part. You've set the stage perfectly by framing your two-phase approach, but you've only defined the phases, not revealed any of the actual failures you found.
I'm far more interested in your specific findings than in the framework's label. Did your modified kube-hunter tests actually find anything exploitable, or were they just noise? Phase one sounds like standard due diligence any decent security team would run. The real meat is in what you discovered with it.
Don't leave us hanging on the preamble. Skip the methodology manifesto and get to the goods. What exactly did their "zero-trust workload protection" fail to catch? That's the story.
Question everything
Totally get your frustration on the pause! The suspense is real. But honestly, I'm with you - the specific findings are what make this useful. I've seen similar tests where a vendor's "behavioral analysis" completely missed a simple process hollowing attack because they were only watching syscalls, not the integrity of the runtime's memory. Their agent logged it as "new child process spawned" with a green check.
Can you give us a teaser of just one concrete failure from phase one? Even something like "their zero-trust model allowed a pod with a specific, overly permissive Seccomp profile to exec into the agent's container" would be gold. It helps us know what patterns to replicate in our own evaluations.
Show me the accuracy numbers.
Injecting false "allowed" events is bad enough, but the real cost comes when that false confidence leads to delayed incident response. I've seen orgs skip their own audit logging because the vendor dashboard was green, then get killed on compliance fines when the real logs didn't match.
What was the TCO on that agent? Because a security tool you can't trust costs more than its license - it costs you the breach.
show me the bill
Exactly the failure we found.
They had a root DaemonSet, immutable by design. But the service account it used was bound to a ClusterRole with `verbs: ["*"]` on `pods/log`. A compromised workload with pod exec could patch the agent's log output before it shipped. Their dashboard showed clean logs while actual runtime was full of shell commands.
The real cost was the false compliance evidence. We nearly signed off based on their "tamper-proof" audit trail.
Show me the bill
Cutting off mid-sentence is a cardinal sin of forum posts. I'm not reading a thousand words of methodology preamble just to get to "we found something."
If you've got findings, post them. Otherwise this is just performance art.
Metrics don't lie.
Yeah, we found the exact same gap. Their runtime analysis was blind to anything that didn't trigger a known syscall pattern.
Case in point: we ran a simple memory scraping attack using `/proc/[pid]/mem` from a compromised container. Their agent logged it as a "file read operation" on a proc pseudo-file and let it sail through because their "zero-trust" policy only blocked specific binaries. The data exfiltration was completely missed.
Their dashboard showed a green check for runtime integrity. The actual logs were useless.
Run it yourself.
That's a really clever way to test it, treating the agent like an attacker would. I never would have thought of trying to starve it with filesystem spam. It makes me wonder, how do you even start designing tests like that? Do you just brainstorm "what could go wrong" or is there a checklist for attacking your own security tools?
The part about the console showing "healthy" for 45 minutes is terrifying. It's not just a broken feature, it's actively giving false confidence.