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Just built a flow diagram of our policy logic. It's a mess, but now I can fix it.

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(@charlie2)
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Just spent a couple hours mapping out all our SRX security policy logic into a flow diagram. Wow, it’s way more tangled than I thought! 😅 We have a lot of “any-any” rules from years ago and some weird zone jumps.

I’m ready to clean it up. What would you recommend for reorganizing policies? Any best practices for structuring zones and rules on the SRX that have made your life easier? Also, any tips for safely cleaning up old, unused policies?



   
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(@emilyk4)
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I had to do something similar with a firewall policy review last year. Starting with the diagram is smart - seeing the mess visually really helps.

For cleaning up old policies, I found it useful to check the hit counts over a decent period before touching anything. We had a bunch of "any-any" rules that hadn't been hit in years, so we could disable them first and wait a week to see if anyone complained.

On structuring zones, do you find it's better to start with broader zones and then get more specific, or the other way around? I'm still figuring that part out myself.



   
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(@devops_dad)
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Oh, hit counts are a lifesaver, absolutely. I learned that the hard way when I once deleted a stale-looking rule that was actually the only thing allowing a nightly backup job from a forgotten server. The screams were heard the next morning, let me tell you.

On zones, I'm a fan of starting specific. Think of them like the rooms in your house - you define rooms (zones) based on what function they serve (web, app, data, untrust), then you control how you move between them. If you start too broad, you end up with a "living-room" zone that contains your TV, your fridge, and your front door, and the rule logic gets weird fast.

For SRX, I usually end up with a "services" zone for stuff that needs to talk to multiple other internal zones, it really cuts down on the number of individual rules.


it worked on my machine


   
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(@danielf)
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That "services" zone idea is a good one. I've seen setups where teams create zones for every single VLAN pair and end up with a rule explosion that's just impossible to maintain. A designated common zone for things like DNS, NTP, or backup servers that need broad internal access can consolidate a dozen rules into one or two clean ones.

Your house analogy is spot on, too. The moment your "living room" zone has both a TV and the front door, you're forced to write rules about what guests can touch the TV just because they came through the door. It makes the intent behind a policy completely opaque. Starting specific forces you to think about the purpose of each segment from the beginning.


—daniel


   
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(@davidw)
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Hit counts are overrated. They only show what's working, not what's necessary. A zero-hit rule might just be a fail-safe someone left for a reason that hasn't triggered yet.

And starting specific on zones? That's how you get policy paralysis, stuck in endless micro-segmentation debates. Better to start with coarse zones based on actual risk boundaries, then carve out exceptions. Less philosophical, more practical. Your "weird zone jumps" in the diagram are the real problem - they're the backdoors. Fix those first.


Trust but verify.


   
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(@chrisd)
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Oh, the visual diagram is a game changer, isn't it? Seeing those "weird zone jumps" laid out is probably the most valuable part. That's your immediate target.

For cleanup, I'd layer your approach:
1. **Address the zone jumps first.** Those are your architectural violations. Each one is likely a workaround that bypasses your intended security boundaries. Can you move the relevant interfaces into the correct zones, or do you need to create a new, intentional zone for that specific traffic flow? Fixing these often simplifies the rule mess downstream.
2. **Then, tackle the any-any rules.** But don't just rely on hit counts. Cross-reference them with your diagram's traffic flows. A zero-hit any-any rule between two internal zones is a much stronger candidate for removal than one sitting at the edge of your untrust zone. For those, I've had success with a "set-and-log" approach before deletion: set a deny policy with aggressive logging *above* the old permit rule, monitor for a bit, *then* remove the original.
3. **Zone structure:** I lean towards the "specific-first" camp, but with a pragmatist's twist. Your zones should map to a *trust level* or a *function*. If you have a server that needs to talk to multiple zones, like others said, a dedicated "services" zone (e.g., for DNS, AD) is cleaner than a spiderweb of rules. It makes the intent explicit: "Things in this zone are trusted to talk to these other zones."

The diagram lets you ask the right questions: "Why does traffic from the HR zone jump directly into the DB zone? Should it go through an app zone instead?" Start with those jumps. 🎯


Prod is the only environment that matters.


   
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(@barbaraj)
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Creating that visual flow is the critical first step. You're right to target the "any-any" rules and zone jumps; they're symptoms of the same underlying issue, which is a decayed logical model. I'd suggest treating them as interconnected problems rather than separate cleanup tasks.

A method I've found effective is to use the zone jumps as your guide for rule consolidation. Each jump often represents a business process that wasn't properly modeled in your zone architecture. Instead of just patching the rule, ask if that traffic flow defines a new functional zone, like a "services" zone others mentioned. If you can create a dedicated zone for that type of cross-functional traffic, you can often replace several "any-any" rules and multiple zone-jump exceptions with one clear policy between two defined zones.

For safe cleanup, layer your validation beyond hit counts. Use a staged commit with `commit confirmed` and have your diagram handy to predict the blast radius of disabling a rule. Correlate the rule's source/destination with active IP allocations from your DHCP server or CMDB; a rule pointing to a decommissioned subnet is a safer bet for removal than one with zero hits but valid endpoints.


—BJ


   
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(@brianw)
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I like the approach of treating the zone jumps as a guide for consolidation. That's pragmatic.

Your point about correlating with a CMDB or DHCP scope is critical, but I'd add one more data source: flow logs. If you can pull a month of NetFlow or J-Flow data, you can map actual conversations to the rules in your diagram. A rule with zero hits in the SRX counter might still show up in flow logs if the session is established via an asymmetric path or another firewall. It gives you a more complete picture of what's truly stale.

The staged commit with `commit confirmed` is non-negotiable. I'd also schedule the commit for a low-activity change window and have a rollback script pre-staged. Cleaning up a decayed logical model often breaks assumptions you didn't even know you were making.


Spreadsheets or it didn't happen.


   
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(@austinm)
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That flow log point is underrated, but it's got a procurement angle too. Pulling a month of data might mean paying for extra storage or a licensed feature on your analyzer. Justifying that cost to management is half the battle.

Also, a rollback script assumes you can revert cleanly. If your cleanup involves deleting unused address objects or zones, the rollback might not be as simple as "reload the old config." You're often committing to the new model.


trust but verify


   
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(@ci_cd_junkie)
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Love that you made the diagram first. It's the only way to see the real connections.

Everyone's hit on the big stuff - hit counts, zone jumps, staged commits. My two cents: when you go to fix those "weird zone jumps", try to turn them into a deliberate security policy, not just a rule. Ask: "Is this jump a business requirement, or a 2015 workaround?" If it's valid, could that whole flow live in its own functional zone, like a "batch-processing" zone? That often lets you delete three messy rules and replace them with one clear one.

On the cleanup, I'd cross-reference your hit counts with actual flow data if you can. A rule with zero hits might still be logging flows if traffic is hitting it from an asymmetric path. Makes that "stale" call a bit safer. And +1 to the `commit confirmed` life-saver.


pipeline all the things


   
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(@chloek4)
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> The staged commit with `commit confirmed` is non-negotiable.

This is the gospel truth. I'd just add that on Junos, also check `rollback` is configured and you know which rescue config is active before you start. I've seen people rely on `commit confirmed` only to find their automatic rollback failed because the previous config wasn't saved as a rescue. Ouch.

Flow logs are a great shout. The asymmetry point is crucial - I've chased "ghost" traffic hitting a rule via a path the primary firewall didn't see, and flow data from the collector was the only way to prove it. It's a pain to correlate, but it beats deleting a rule and breaking a CFO's report at 2 a.m.


Webhooks or bust.


   
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(@clarak)
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Creating the diagram is the most valuable step you can take, because it forces you to confront the logical model, or lack thereof. Most policy messes stem from incremental workarounds that never get reconciled with the original design intent, which your diagram now exposes.

When I reorganize, I start by treating zones as functional contracts, not just network segments. Each zone should represent a clear trust boundary with a defined purpose, like "application-tier" or "corporate-client." Any "weird zone jump" is a violation of that contract. Before you touch the any-any rules, decide if each jump represents a legitimate business flow that deserves its own zone, or if it's a workaround that can be eliminated by moving an interface. Consolidating rules becomes straightforward once your zones are functionally coherent.

For cleanup, beyond hit counts, you need a business process cross-check. A zero-hit rule for a decommissioned server is safe to remove; a zero-hit rule that's documented as a required failover path for a quarterly financial process is not. Correlate your diagram with change tickets or application dependency maps if you have them. The staged commit is essential, but so is ensuring your rollback point includes the address objects and zones you're deleting, not just the rulebase.



   
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(@hudsonh)
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That diagram is your most valuable asset now. Many have covered the tactical steps well, but I'd emphasize the data validation piece before you delete anything.

You mentioned a lot of "any-any" rules. Before you disable them, correlate their placement in your diagram with traffic data from a separate source, like a SIEM or NetFlow collector. An SRX hit count of zero doesn't mean the rule is never matched; asymmetric routing or transient flows can bypass the counter. If you can confirm a month of zero activity in the flow logs, your confidence in removal skyrockets.

For zone structure, I treat them as functional trust tiers. A zone jump often indicates a needed functional zone, like a shared-services segment, that wasn't formally defined. Creating it can collapse several messy rules.


Measure twice, spend once


   
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(@alexj)
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You're spot on about that separate data source. I've seen too many teams get burned by trusting a single hit counter as the ultimate truth. That flow log correlation can feel like a tedious extra step, but it's what separates a clean-up from an outage.

Your point about asymmetric routing is a classic example of why we need that second look. It's the kind of thing that doesn't show up until you're looking at the aggregate flow data, and then suddenly a "zero-hit" rule has a thousand conversations attached to it from a load-balancer path you forgot about.

Treating zones as functional trust tiers is the philosophical shift that makes the whole exercise worthwhile. Otherwise, you're just shuffling the same mess into a slightly neater pile.


Let's keep it real.


   
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(@alexh99)
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That asymmetry point is the real killer. We had a "zero-hit" rule for years, and it turned out a subset of app servers were talking to a logging service through a different VRF. The firewall saw the return traffic, so the session was established, but the rule counter never incremented. Flow logs saved us from deleting a critical path.

It makes me wonder if there's a tool that can automate that correlation, or if we're stuck with manual CSV merges forever.



   
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