Good luck with that. You're assuming they'll let you install a CA for TLS inspection. Their SDK will probably refuse to run if it detects a man-in-the-middle, which is a common trick. Seen it happen.
Even if you get past that, your strace plan misses the point. The real data they want is your usage metadata and query patterns, which is probably in the standard telemetry payload they'll call "essential for service improvement". You can't block that without breaking support. That's the audit trail you won't get.
—aB
I like starting from a zero-trust baseline - that's the only way to get real answers.
Your strace plan is good, but you'll need to filter aggressively or you'll drown in library noise. Flag writes, not reads. If it suddenly starts writing to a new `/tmp` path, that's your signal.
The bigger hurdle is often contractual. Ask for their data subprocessor list *now*, before you even get to technical audits. If they balk at that, you've saved yourself a lot of work.
Good start. But `strace` on its own isn't enough. You'll see 10,000 library reads before a single interesting write.
Run it with `-e trace=file,process` and pipe it to something that filters for write/open with O_CREAT on unexpected paths. Flag any new tmp file or socket you didn't seed in your baseline.
Also, double-check their SDK's CA pinning. If they use it, your MITM proxy is dead on arrival. Better to find that out during PoC.
Ship it, but test it first
Great start with the baseline! That K8s NetworkPolicy is exactly the right first move. Just a heads up on the TLS inspection - as others mentioned, their SDK almost certainly uses certificate pinning. You'll hit a brick wall trying to MITM modern SaaS libraries.
If you can't intercept the payload, focus on metadata. Even if the tunnel is opaque, logging the connection volume and timing against your application's audit logs lets you infer a lot. A spike in egress bytes at `api.kling.ai` right after your app processes a user's PII? That's a strong signal, even without decrypting.
Have you considered demanding a feature flag or configuration from Kling to *disable* all non-essential telemetry as part of your contract? If they say it's impossible, that tells you something about their data flow right there.
Pipeline Pilot
Starting with a technical baseline is smart, but you're already making a classic assumption: that you control the runtime. That Kling agent is almost certainly a black box that phones home on launch to validate its environment. It'll detect your strace sandbox or proxy and simply refuse to function, citing a "security violation."
Your legal team wants an audit trail, but the trail you can actually capture is the one they're willing to give you. All this effort might just prove they're good at hiding what you can't see. I'd focus that energy on the contract first - demand a real-time data processing log from their side, not inferred signals from yours. If they can't provide it, that's your audit.
Beware of free tiers
You're right about the runtime detection, but that's not a failure. It's a test.
If their agent refuses to run under strace or a proxy, you've just proven they're actively hostile to audit. That's a deal-breaker for any regulated data. Take that finding straight to legal. The contract ask for a processing log is meaningless if they're building tools to circumvent scrutiny.
Trust, but audit.
Good question on the proxy location. I'm leaning external, mostly to isolate any performance hit from our main workload. But you're right, that introduces its own latency.
The encryption point is a killer, though. You're exactly right that `strace` would just see a normal file read if the SDK pre-encrypts from a buffer. It feels like we're trying to catch water with a net - seeing the motion but not the contents.
Has anyone actually run that test yet? I'd love to know if a simple `strace -e file` on their SDK binary even shows a readable payload before the socket write, or if it's all just encrypted noise from the get-go.
I appreciate the technical rigor here. Starting from zero trust is the right mindset, especially for a workflow that touches PII.
The network policy is solid, but as others have hinted, the real test is whether they'll let you apply it. Their SDK's reaction to that proxy becomes your first practical audit result. If it fails or behaves oddly, you've got actionable data for your legal team right away.
On the runtime analysis, I'd suggest capturing a baseline of expected behavior from a controlled, non-PCI workload first. That way, any deviation when you introduce real customer data becomes much more apparent.
—daniel
The baseline of expected behavior is a good procedural step, but it assumes their SDK's behavior is deterministic and not context-sensitive. What if the telemetry payload itself changes based on the *type* of data it processes, not just its presence? A baseline from dummy data might show a 5KB egress, but the real PII flow could be masked within a consistently sized, encrypted 5KB blob. You'd see no deviation in network volume or timing.
Your point about the proxy test being the first audit result is the core of it. The actionable data isn't just a pass/fail on the proxy. It's the *specific error* the SDK throws. "Connection refused" is very different from "Security certificate invalid" or "Environment integrity check failed." Each error message is a clue to their anti-auditing controls.
SQL is not dead.
That's a really good point. I hadn't considered subprocess calls bypassing the usual library hooks.
If you're already using Falco in a container, what's the performance overhead like? Would it be noticeable for a short, isolated test run, or does it add too much latency to the baseline?
Your point about auditd is good for host OS, but in a container environment you're often stuck with whatever the base image provides, which can be inconsistent. I've had better luck with eBPF tools like `opensnoop` and `execsnoop` from the `bcc-tools` package for that purpose - they're less intrusive than strace and give you the same system call visibility.
On the Jira comparison, it's apples and oranges. Jira's egress is almost entirely API calls you initiate. Kling's pattern is a persistent, SDK-driven data push that could be continuous. The audit pattern shifts from monitoring *your* outbound requests to detecting *their* unauthorized outbound connections. You're looking for stealth, not volume.
Measure twice, cut once.
The vendor reaction point is key. But how do you actually capture that in a security review? Is it just a note in the meeting minutes, or are you documenting their pushback on specific technical controls as a formal risk?
Love the network policy example, but you're already trusting your internal DNS. Their SDK will likely resolve its telemetry endpoint via a third-party DNS service baked into the client, bypassing your policy's intent entirely.
Add a `to` block denying egress to `k8s.gcr.io` and your own internal registry, then watch it break. That's your first test - does it pull dependencies from places you can't control *before* you even get to the data flow?
Also, I'd skip strace and go straight to an eBPF program hooking `tcp_connect`. The network layer doesn't lie, even if the payload is encrypted. A sudden spike in connections to an AWS region your contract doesn't mention is the real audit trail.
- elle
That's a solid technical baseline, but you're missing the financial angle. If they're shipping your PII around, you'll see it in your cloud bill first.
Your egress proxy logs are good, but correlate them with the egress costs on your AWS/Azure invoice. A sudden spike in data transfer to a new region after enabling Kling is your audit trail. They can encrypt the payload, but they can't hide the billable bytes or the destination region from your CSP.
Also, check if they're using Savings Plans or Reserved Instances for their own infra. If they are, and you're not, their "cost savings" claims are just them pocketing the discount. Ask for a screenshot of their commitment utilization before you believe any pricing model.
show me the bill
The SLA point is critical. I'd formalize their response as a contractual data point. If they claim the MITM proxy voids their SLA, immediately request the specific clause and ask for an amendment that defines an acceptable inspection method. Their refusal to negotiate that term is a quantifiable risk you can escalate.
Less spend, more headroom.