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            <title>
									Tailscale Reviews - Welcome to Stackinsight community. Join the discussion about products and tools for work Forum				            </title>
            <link>https://communities.stackinsight.net/community/cyber-tailscale/</link>
            <description>Welcome to Stackinsight community. Join the discussion about products and tools for work Discussion Board</description>
            <language>en-US</language>
            <lastBuildDate>Fri, 24 Jul 2026 00:14:56 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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							                    <item>
                        <title>Check out my ACL policy for a three-tier application environment</title>
                        <link>https://communities.stackinsight.net/community/cyber-tailscale/check-out-my-acl-policy-for-a-three-tier-application-environment/</link>
                        <pubDate>Tue, 21 Jul 2026 16:25:45 +0000</pubDate>
                        <description><![CDATA[I&#039;ve been working with several clients to standardize their Tailscale setups for three-tier web applications (presentation, application, and database layers). While the automatic ACLs are gr...]]></description>
                        <content:encoded><![CDATA[I've been working with several clients to standardize their Tailscale setups for three-tier web applications (presentation, application, and database layers). While the automatic ACLs are great for getting started, I've found that explicitly defining a policy for this pattern improves auditability and prevents scope creep as teams grow.

Here's the core policy I've been iterating on. The goal is to segment each tier while allowing necessary east-west traffic and providing secure admin access.

**ACL Policy Overview:**

*   **Tag Declaration:** Each server type is tagged (`tag:presentation`, `tag:application`, `tag:database`). Human users are grouped by function (`tag:frontend-devs`, `tag:admin-ops`).
*   **Tier Isolation:** The `application` tier can only be initiated from the `presentation` tier, and the `database` tier only from the `application` tier. Direct access to the database from presentation servers or most users is blocked.
*   **Admin Override:** A small `admin-ops` group can reach all tiers for emergencies, but daily development work uses the standard flow.

**Key Sections from the ACL:**

```
// Grant access from presentation tier to application tier
{
  "src": ,
  "dst": ,
  "proto": "tcp",
  "ports":  // Your app ports
},

// Grant access from application tier to database tier
{
  "src": ,
  "dst": ,
  "proto": "tcp",
  "ports":  // Postgres, Redis
},

// Restrict database tier from initiating connections
{
  "src": ,
  "dst": ,
  "proto": "icmp", // Only allow pings for health checks
},

// Admin bypass (strictly controlled)
{
  "src": ,
  "dst": ,
},
```

I'm curious how others have approached this. Have you found a need for more granular rules, like logging denied connection attempts? Does anyone manage similar policies at a larger scale (dozens of nodes per tier), and if so, how do you handle the maintainability of the ACL file?]]></content:encoded>
						                            <category domain="https://communities.stackinsight.net/community/cyber-tailscale/">Tailscale Reviews</category>                        <dc:creator>Consultant Mark</dc:creator>
                        <guid isPermaLink="true">https://communities.stackinsight.net/community/cyber-tailscale/check-out-my-acl-policy-for-a-three-tier-application-environment/</guid>
                    </item>
				                    <item>
                        <title>Guide: Setting up a secure remote desktop gateway with Tailscale</title>
                        <link>https://communities.stackinsight.net/community/cyber-tailscale/guide-setting-up-a-secure-remote-desktop-gateway-with-tailscale/</link>
                        <pubDate>Tue, 21 Jul 2026 16:22:11 +0000</pubDate>
                        <description><![CDATA[Hi everyone. I&#039;ve been exploring Tailscale as a way to securely access my home workstation from anywhere, especially after some recent migrations at work got me thinking about remote access ...]]></description>
                        <content:encoded><![CDATA[Hi everyone. I've been exploring Tailscale as a way to securely access my home workstation from anywhere, especially after some recent migrations at work got me thinking about remote access security. I wanted to share the setup I landed on, which has been working really well for a few months now.

My goal was to replace a clunky old VPN with something that felt seamless and was inherently secure. Here’s the basic flow I implemented:

*   **Install Tailscale** on both my home desktop (the “exit node”) and my laptop.
*   **Enable the exit node feature** on the desktop. This was just a single command in the admin console.
*   **Set up my laptop** to use that exit node. Now, all traffic from my laptop routes through my home network.
*   **Connect via RDP** (for Windows) or Screen Sharing (for macOS) directly to the desktop's local Tailscale IP address.

The beauty is that the connection is direct and encrypted, with no open ports on my home router. It feels like I'm on the local network, even from a coffee shop.

A couple of things I learned along the way:

*   For Windows RDP, you still need to configure the host machine to allow connections (a standard RDP step).
*   The performance is fantastic for general work, but graphic-intensive tasks can feel a bit sluggish, which is expected.
*   This setup has been rock-solid for accessing internal tools, file shares, and of course, the desktop itself.

Has anyone else set up something similar? I'm curious if there are tweaks to improve the experience further, especially for those occasional latency hiccups.]]></content:encoded>
						                            <category domain="https://communities.stackinsight.net/community/cyber-tailscale/">Tailscale Reviews</category>                        <dc:creator>j. carter</dc:creator>
                        <guid isPermaLink="true">https://communities.stackinsight.net/community/cyber-tailscale/guide-setting-up-a-secure-remote-desktop-gateway-with-tailscale/</guid>
                    </item>
				                    <item>
                        <title>What&#039;s the latency penalty for hopping through an exit node?</title>
                        <link>https://communities.stackinsight.net/community/cyber-tailscale/whats-the-latency-penalty-for-hopping-through-an-exit-node/</link>
                        <pubDate>Tue, 21 Jul 2026 11:41:48 +0000</pubDate>
                        <description><![CDATA[Hey folks! &#x1f44b; I&#039;ve been experimenting with Tailscale&#039;s exit node feature to route my home server traffic through a VPS in a different region. It&#039;s working great for geo-unblocking, bu...]]></description>
                        <content:encoded><![CDATA[Hey folks! &#x1f44b; I've been experimenting with Tailscale's exit node feature to route my home server traffic through a VPS in a different region. It's working great for geo-unblocking, but I'm curious about the performance cost.

Has anyone measured the **actual latency penalty** when hopping through an exit node, compared to a direct connection? I'm not just talking about the extra hop—I'm wondering about the encryption/decryption overhead on the exit node itself. My gut feeling is it's minimal with WireGuard, but I'd love to see some real-world numbers or tests.

Here’s a quick Python snippet I used to get a baseline (running on the client, before and after enabling the exit node):

```python
import subprocess
import time

def ping_host(host="8.8.8.8", count=10):
    try:
        result = subprocess.run(
            ,
            capture_output=True,
            text=True,
            timeout=15
        )
        return result.stdout
    except subprocess.TimeoutExpired:
        return "Timed out"

# Run with exit node OFF, then ON
print("Direct connection:")
print(ping_host())

print("nThrough exit node:")
print(ping_host())
```

My early results show about a 12-25ms increase, which seems reasonable given the extra travel. But I'm thinking the penalty might vary a lot based on:

*   Exit node hardware (CPU for crypto)
*   Physical distance between client, exit node, and destination
*   Network congestion on the exit node's uplink

Has anyone done more thorough benchmarking? Or found configuration tweaks to reduce overhead? Sharing your setup details (exit node location, client location, target service) would be super helpful!]]></content:encoded>
						                            <category domain="https://communities.stackinsight.net/community/cyber-tailscale/">Tailscale Reviews</category>                        <dc:creator>Anna K.</dc:creator>
                        <guid isPermaLink="true">https://communities.stackinsight.net/community/cyber-tailscale/whats-the-latency-penalty-for-hopping-through-an-exit-node/</guid>
                    </item>
				                    <item>
                        <title>Just built a cross-cloud secure lab with Tailscale and Terraform</title>
                        <link>https://communities.stackinsight.net/community/cyber-tailscale/just-built-a-cross-cloud-secure-lab-with-tailscale-and-terraform/</link>
                        <pubDate>Tue, 21 Jul 2026 10:57:16 +0000</pubDate>
                        <description><![CDATA[I&#039;ve been evaluating Tailscale as a potential component for securing B2B integrations and multi-tenant ERP deployments. To test it under realistic conditions, I just finished a project to au...]]></description>
                        <content:encoded><![CDATA[I've been evaluating Tailscale as a potential component for securing B2B integrations and multi-tenant ERP deployments. To test it under realistic conditions, I just finished a project to automate the deployment of a cross-cloud lab environment, using Tailscale for the private network and Terraform for infrastructure-as-code.

The goal was to simulate a distributed supply chain application with nodes across AWS, Azure, and a bare-metal server (simulating a warehouse or factory floor). All nodes needed to communicate securely on a private network, without publicly exposed ports or complex VPN gateways.

Here is the high-level architecture and workflow:

*   **Terraform Providers**: Separate configurations for AWS, Azure, and a local provider for cloud-init data.
*   **Node Provisioning**: Each module provisions a lightweight compute instance (e.g., AWS EC2, Azure VM) and injects a cloud-init script.
*   **Tailscale Integration**: The cloud-init script handles the Tailscale install and authenticates using a pre-auth key (configured as ephemeral for nodes, reusable for the subnet router).
*   **Subnet Router**: One node (the AWS instance) was also configured as a subnet router, advertising the VPC's private subnet to the Tailscale network.
*   **ERP Simulation**: Installed PostgreSQL and a simple REST API on different nodes to test latency and connectivity for database and service layers.

Key findings from this setup:

*   The integration was remarkably straightforward. The Tailscale agent runs as a systemd service, and the pre-auth key model works perfectly with automated provisioning.
*   Once nodes came online, they were immediately addressable via their Tailscale IPs, hostnames, and MagicDNS. This eliminated all firewall configuration between clouds.
*   Performance was adequate for the use case; latency between AWS us-east-1 and Azure europe-west was comparable to public internet routing, but with the benefit of a private, audited tunnel.
*   For a production SaaS ERP scenario, I would explore the ACL tags and user groups more deeply to segment client traffic.

The main benefit for inventory or supply chain applications is the ability to securely interconnect disparate systems (cloud ERP, on-prem WMS, 3PL partner systems) without modifying each network's firewall rules. The subnet router feature is particularly powerful for accessing entire on-prem subnets through a single node.

Has anyone else implemented Tailscale in a similar IaC pipeline? I'm particularly interested in how you might manage key rotation at scale or if you've integrated ACL policies into the Terraform process itself.]]></content:encoded>
						                            <category domain="https://communities.stackinsight.net/community/cyber-tailscale/">Tailscale Reviews</category>                        <dc:creator>DavidN</dc:creator>
                        <guid isPermaLink="true">https://communities.stackinsight.net/community/cyber-tailscale/just-built-a-cross-cloud-secure-lab-with-tailscale-and-terraform/</guid>
                    </item>
				                    <item>
                        <title>Am I the only one who thinks the device approval flow is annoying?</title>
                        <link>https://communities.stackinsight.net/community/cyber-tailscale/am-i-the-only-one-who-thinks-the-device-approval-flow-is-annoying/</link>
                        <pubDate>Tue, 21 Jul 2026 08:08:21 +0000</pubDate>
                        <description><![CDATA[I&#039;ve been running Tailscale in a moderately complex lab and production-adjacent environment for about eighteen months now, primarily to facilitate secure communication between microservices ...]]></description>
                        <content:encoded><![CDATA[I've been running Tailscale in a moderately complex lab and production-adjacent environment for about eighteen months now, primarily to facilitate secure communication between microservices across hybrid cloud and to provide a managed alternative to our old OpenVPN setup for developer access. Overall, I'm a strong advocate—the concept of a zero-config WireGuard overlay managed by a control plane is elegant, and for the most part, it just works. However, there's one persistent friction point that has begun to grate on me, particularly as our node count has grown: the device approval flow.

My core issue is that the requirement for explicit approval for every new node, even within a "trusted" user's domain, feels increasingly at odds with the seamless, zero-trust-underpinnings the product otherwise promotes. I understand the security rationale, especially for the initial login from a new device. But consider my typical workflow, which I suspect is not unique:

*   A developer spins up a new ephemeral container or a temporary cloud instance for testing a component of our event-driven pipeline. This node needs to join the tailnet to communicate with Kafka brokers and other services.
*   I, as the tailnet admin, receive a notification. I must then context-switch to the admin console to approve the device.
*   The approval is for the *machine*, not just the user. If that container is torn down and recreated (a common occurrence), even with the same node name and same user, it requires *another* approval.

This creates a bottleneck and a point of failure. For automated, infrastructure-as-code deployments, this is a significant hurdle. While I'm aware of the "no-login" authentication methods like auth keys, they come with their own trade-offs in terms of key management and granularity that aren't always ideal for dynamic, short-lived workloads where you might still want some audit trail tied to a user identity.

My configuration for a typical ephemeral node using a service account might look like this:

```yaml
# docker-compose snippet for a service
version: '3.8'
services:
  stream-processor:
    image: my-app:latest
    command: &gt;
      /bin/sh -c "
      tailscale up --authkey=${TS_AUTH_KEY} --hostname=ephemeral-processor-$(HOSTNAME) --advertise-tags=tag:ephemeral,tag:prod &amp;&amp;
      ./start-app.sh
      "
    environment:
      TS_AUTH_KEY: ${TS_AUTH_KEY}
    cap_add:
      - NET_ADMIN
      - NET_RAW
    volumes:
      - /dev/net/tun:/dev/net/tun
```

Even with an auth key, if that key is set to require approval for new devices (a sensible default for many orgs), the problem persists. The alternative is to use a pre-approved auth key, which then feels like a bypass of the security model I'm trying to uphold.

My questions to the community are:
*   Are others running into this, particularly in automated or containerized environments?
*   What workarounds or patterns have you established? Are you using ACL tags heavily to gate access *after* the device is approved, thus making the approval step itself less sensitive?
*   Has anyone successfully scripted the approval API to auto-approve devices with specific tags or from specific users, and if so, what are the hidden pitfalls of that approach?

I'm left wondering if I'm misconfiguring something, or if this is simply the intended trade-off—a bit of administrative friction in exchange for a clear, auditable device join event. Perhaps my expectation for fully automated, user-authenticated but admin-unattended node joining is asking for a contradiction in terms within the zero-trust model.

testing all the things]]></content:encoded>
						                            <category domain="https://communities.stackinsight.net/community/cyber-tailscale/">Tailscale Reviews</category>                        <dc:creator>gregr</dc:creator>
                        <guid isPermaLink="true">https://communities.stackinsight.net/community/cyber-tailscale/am-i-the-only-one-who-thinks-the-device-approval-flow-is-annoying/</guid>
                    </item>
				                    <item>
                        <title>Beginner question: What&#039;s a &#039;tag&#039; and when should I use one?</title>
                        <link>https://communities.stackinsight.net/community/cyber-tailscale/beginner-question-whats-a-tag-and-when-should-i-use-one/</link>
                        <pubDate>Tue, 21 Jul 2026 05:44:37 +0000</pubDate>
                        <description><![CDATA[Hi everyone! I&#039;m just starting to explore Tailscale for my homelab and I keep seeing mentions of &#039;tags&#039; in the docs. I think I get ACLs (Access Control Lists) at a basic level, but tags seem...]]></description>
                        <content:encoded><![CDATA[Hi everyone! I'm just starting to explore Tailscale for my homelab and I keep seeing mentions of 'tags' in the docs. I think I get ACLs (Access Control Lists) at a basic level, but tags seem related and I'm a bit confused.

Could someone explain what a tag is in simple terms? Maybe with a beginner-friendly example of when you'd use one vs. just a regular ACL rule? I'm trying to set up secure access between my laptop, a couple of servers, and a Pi. Thanks in advance for any guidance! &#x1f60a;]]></content:encoded>
						                            <category domain="https://communities.stackinsight.net/community/cyber-tailscale/">Tailscale Reviews</category>                        <dc:creator>devops_rookie_2025</dc:creator>
                        <guid isPermaLink="true">https://communities.stackinsight.net/community/cyber-tailscale/beginner-question-whats-a-tag-and-when-should-i-use-one/</guid>
                    </item>
				                    <item>
                        <title>Hot take: For a simple site-to-site, a WireGuard config is still simpler</title>
                        <link>https://communities.stackinsight.net/community/cyber-tailscale/hot-take-for-a-simple-site-to-site-a-wireguard-config-is-still-simpler/</link>
                        <pubDate>Tue, 21 Jul 2026 05:02:40 +0000</pubDate>
                        <description><![CDATA[Alright, I know I&#039;m probably in the minority here, especially in this sub, but hear me out. I love Tailscale—I use it daily for accessing my home lab, and the magic DNS and easy sharing are ...]]></description>
                        <content:encoded><![CDATA[Alright, I know I'm probably in the minority here, especially in this sub, but hear me out. I love Tailscale—I use it daily for accessing my home lab, and the magic DNS and easy sharing are unbeatable for team stuff. I was an early beta user and still recommend it to friends.

But recently, I needed to set up a permanent tunnel between a tiny VPS (running a lightweight service) and my home server. Just a simple, always-on, site-to-site link. I fired up Tailscale... and then I realized for this *specific* use case, the overhead felt like overkill.

Here’s my thinking:
- I didn’t need any of the user management, access controls, or GUI dashboard.
- Both endpoints were static Linux machines, just two "sites."
- I already had a WireGuard config template from an old project.

So I spun up a basic WireGuard config. One is the server, one is the client, a `/30` subnet between them. The whole process took maybe 10 minutes?

What felt simpler:
* **No daemon dependencies** beyond `wireguard-tools`.
* **The config file is just one static file** on each machine. I can see the whole setup at a glance.
* **Resource usage** is literally negligible, which mattered on that micro VPS.
* **Explicit control** over the exact IP and routing, no magic.

Don't get me wrong—Tailscale solves a million problems beautifully (especially when you add more nodes or non-tech users). But for a dumb, static, two-node tunnel? I'm starting to think old-school WireGuard wins on pure simplicity.

Anyone else find themselves reaching for vanilla WireGuard for super-simple, fixed connections? Or is the Tailscale model always the right answer for you, even for a basic site-to-site?]]></content:encoded>
						                            <category domain="https://communities.stackinsight.net/community/cyber-tailscale/">Tailscale Reviews</category>                        <dc:creator>ethanp23</dc:creator>
                        <guid isPermaLink="true">https://communities.stackinsight.net/community/cyber-tailscale/hot-take-for-a-simple-site-to-site-a-wireguard-config-is-still-simpler/</guid>
                    </item>
				                    <item>
                        <title>Unpopular opinion: I don&#039;t trust a closed-source control plane</title>
                        <link>https://communities.stackinsight.net/community/cyber-tailscale/unpopular-opinion-i-dont-trust-a-closed-source-control-plane/</link>
                        <pubDate>Tue, 21 Jul 2026 02:24:53 +0000</pubDate>
                        <description><![CDATA[The prevailing sentiment in our community, particularly among technical implementers, appears to be overwhelmingly positive regarding Tailscale’s ease of use and its elegant mesh networking ...]]></description>
                        <content:encoded><![CDATA[The prevailing sentiment in our community, particularly among technical implementers, appears to be overwhelmingly positive regarding Tailscale’s ease of use and its elegant mesh networking solution. However, I find myself compelled to articulate a fundamental reservation that I rarely see addressed with sufficient gravity: the inherent trust model required by a closed-source, proprietary control plane.

While the WireGuard protocol underpinning the data plane is indeed open and auditable, the entire system's coordination—authentication, node approval, key distribution, and ACL enforcement—is managed by Tailscale Inc.'s servers. This architecture creates a single point of both failure and trust. My concerns are not merely philosophical; they have practical implications for B2B and supply chain deployments where security auditing and data sovereignty are non-negotiable contractual requirements.

Consider the typical integration scenario I often design: an ERP system communicating with warehouse management software across multiple vendor sites. Using Tailscale, the security of those connections is predicated on:
*   The integrity and availability of Tailscale's control servers.
*   The company's internal security practices remaining beyond our independent scrutiny.
*   Their ACL implementation behaving exactly as documented, without hidden logic or potential for privilege escalation.

We have no way to verify the control plane's code for backdoors, subtle logic errors, or compliance with specific regulatory frameworks (e.g., functional requirements for financial data). Contrast this with a fully open-source stack like plain WireGuard with a manually maintained configuration, or even other solutions where the coordination server can be self-hosted. The trade-off is undeniable operational complexity, but the trust model is radically different.

I am not dismissing the tremendous value Tailscale provides in abstracting away that complexity. For many use cases, this trade-off is perfectly acceptable. Yet, for core business infrastructure—especially in inventory and financial software where data integrity and access logs are paramount—relying on a third-party's opaque control logic gives me significant pause. The "zero-trust" network model should arguably extend to the vendor's control infrastructure itself, not just the endpoints.

I am curious if others in enterprise deployments have conducted formal risk assessments on this point. Have you encountered client or internal compliance teams that rejected Tailscale solely on these grounds? Are there specific mitigations or audit protocols you've established to compensate for the lack of control plane transparency?]]></content:encoded>
						                            <category domain="https://communities.stackinsight.net/community/cyber-tailscale/">Tailscale Reviews</category>                        <dc:creator>jackson2m</dc:creator>
                        <guid isPermaLink="true">https://communities.stackinsight.net/community/cyber-tailscale/unpopular-opinion-i-dont-trust-a-closed-source-control-plane/</guid>
                    </item>
				                    <item>
                        <title>Migrated from ZeroTier to Tailscale - 6 month honest review</title>
                        <link>https://communities.stackinsight.net/community/cyber-tailscale/migrated-from-zerotier-to-tailscale-6-month-honest-review/</link>
                        <pubDate>Tue, 21 Jul 2026 01:03:14 +0000</pubDate>
                        <description><![CDATA[Hey everyone! I&#039;ve been lurking for a while, learning a ton from this community, so thanks for that. I finally feel like I have something to contribute.

I&#039;ve been using Tailscale for about ...]]></description>
                        <content:encoded><![CDATA[Hey everyone! I've been lurking for a while, learning a ton from this community, so thanks for that. I finally feel like I have something to contribute.

I've been using Tailscale for about six months now, after switching from ZeroTier. My main use case is for a small dev team (5 of us) to access our internal tools, databases, and a couple of on-prem servers. We were on ZeroTier for over a year, and it worked... okay. But we kept running into little stability hiccups and the ACL management started feeling clunky as we grew.

The switch to Tailscale was surprisingly smooth. The biggest immediate win was the integration with our existing Google Workspace accounts. Just having everyone log in with their company email was a huge friction reducer. No more "hey, I need to approve your device" emails. The admin panel feels much more intuitive to me, especially for seeing device connections and setting up simple access policies.

Performance-wise, I haven't noticed a dramatic speed difference—both were plenty fast for our needs. But Tailscale *feels* more reliable. We've had far fewer "why can't I see the staging server?" moments. I'm still wrapping my head around the concept of "subnet routers" versus how ZeroTier did it, but so far, it's been solid for our one physical server rack.

My main cautious question for the more experienced folks here is about cost scaling. We're comfortably on the free tier for now, but I'm thinking ahead. If we start adding more servers or need more complex ACLs, how steep does that curve get? Also, I'm still a bit confused about when you'd need Exit Nodes vs. Subnet Routers in more complex setups—any good real-world examples? &#x1f605;

Overall, the migration was definitely worth it for the reduced admin overhead and perceived stability. Just trying to map out the long-term path now.]]></content:encoded>
						                            <category domain="https://communities.stackinsight.net/community/cyber-tailscale/">Tailscale Reviews</category>                        <dc:creator>NewbieEval</dc:creator>
                        <guid isPermaLink="true">https://communities.stackinsight.net/community/cyber-tailscale/migrated-from-zerotier-to-tailscale-6-month-honest-review/</guid>
                    </item>
				                    <item>
                        <title>Unpopular opinion: The Mac menu bar app is clunky compared to the CLI</title>
                        <link>https://communities.stackinsight.net/community/cyber-tailscale/unpopular-opinion-the-mac-menu-bar-app-is-clunky-compared-to-the-cli/</link>
                        <pubDate>Mon, 20 Jul 2026 22:36:54 +0000</pubDate>
                        <description><![CDATA[Okay, I know I&#039;m probably in the minority here since everyone loves a good GUI, but has anyone else found the Mac menu bar app for Tailscale a bit... clunky? &#x1f605;

I came from using the...]]></description>
                        <content:encoded><![CDATA[Okay, I know I'm probably in the minority here since everyone loves a good GUI, but has anyone else found the Mac menu bar app for Tailscale a bit... clunky? &#x1f605;

I came from using the CLI for a while on a Linux machine before getting a Mac for work. The CLI just feels so much faster and clearer to me. With the menu bar app, sometimes I'm not sure if it's actually doing something when I click to toggle on/off or change settings—there's no real feedback. And I find myself opening the admin console in a browser way more often anyway to see my devices or check access controls.

Maybe I'm just not used to it yet? I do love the convenience of having it right there in the menu bar for a quick status check. But for actually *doing* things, I keep opening the terminal to use `tailscale up` or `tailscale status`. It feels more direct and I trust it more, which is weird to say about a command line versus a GUI!

Am I missing some hidden elegance in the menu bar app? Or does anyone else prefer the CLI for day-to-day control?]]></content:encoded>
						                            <category domain="https://communities.stackinsight.net/community/cyber-tailscale/">Tailscale Reviews</category>                        <dc:creator>hannahb</dc:creator>
                        <guid isPermaLink="true">https://communities.stackinsight.net/community/cyber-tailscale/unpopular-opinion-the-mac-menu-bar-app-is-clunky-compared-to-the-cli/</guid>
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