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            <title>
									IAM and PAM - Welcome to Stackinsight community. Join the discussion about products and tools for work Forum				            </title>
            <link>https://communities.stackinsight.net/community/cyber-iam-pam/</link>
            <description>Welcome to Stackinsight community. Join the discussion about products and tools for work Discussion Board</description>
            <language>en-US</language>
            <lastBuildDate>Thu, 01 Oct 2026 21:40:34 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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							                    <item>
                        <title>Just built a CLI tool to check if our PAM is actually rotating the passwords it says it is.</title>
                        <link>https://communities.stackinsight.net/community/cyber-iam-pam/just-built-a-cli-tool-to-check-if-our-pam-is-actually-rotating-the-passwords-it-says-it-is-2/</link>
                        <pubDate>Mon, 28 Sep 2026 04:01:01 +0000</pubDate>
                        <description><![CDATA[Hey everyone! &#x1f44b; Ever get that sneaking suspicion that your Privileged Access Management (PAM) solution is quietly failing at its one job? We had a policy set to rotate certain servic...]]></description>
                        <content:encoded><![CDATA[Hey everyone! &#x1f44b; Ever get that sneaking suspicion that your Privileged Access Management (PAM) solution is quietly failing at its one job? We had a policy set to rotate certain service account passwords every 30 days, and the dashboard showed all green checkmarks... but I just didn't have 100% faith.

So I built a little CLI tool over the weekend to actually verify it. It connects to both our PAM vault (we use CyberArk) and the target systems (mostly Windows AD and Linux servers via SSH) to do a live check. The number of "successfully rotated" passwords that were, in fact, *unchanged* was... eye-opening.

Here's the core logic. It fetches the current credential from the PAM, then attempts to authenticate with the *previously* stored password (kept in a secure, temporary cache for just this comparison). If the old one still works... we have a problem.

```python
# Simplified check logic
def check_rotation(pam_account, target_host):
    current_password = pam_vault.get_current(pam_account)
    old_password = secure_cache.get_previous(pam_account)

    # Try auth on target with old password
    if can_authenticate(target_host, pam_account.user, old_password):
        logger.error(f"Rotation FAILED for {pam_account.name}")
        return False
    else:
        logger.info(f"Rotation verified for {pam_account.name}")
        return True
```

The tool runs in our CI/CD pipeline nightly, posting results to a Slack channel. It's already caught a handful of accounts stuck in a weird state due to permission issues on the target. The peace of mind is huge.

Has anyone else done something similar? I'm curious about:
* Other methods to validate PAM efficacy beyond trusting the vendor's UI.
* How you might approach this for cloud IAM keys or database secrets, where direct auth attempts are trickier.

Keep deploying]]></content:encoded>
						                            <category domain="https://communities.stackinsight.net/community/cyber-iam-pam/">IAM and PAM</category>                        <dc:creator>MountainMover</dc:creator>
                        <guid isPermaLink="true">https://communities.stackinsight.net/community/cyber-iam-pam/just-built-a-cli-tool-to-check-if-our-pam-is-actually-rotating-the-passwords-it-says-it-is-2/</guid>
                    </item>
				                    <item>
                        <title>Anyone deployed Oasis Security at scale? Honest take</title>
                        <link>https://communities.stackinsight.net/community/cyber-iam-pam/anyone-deployed-oasis-security-at-scale-honest-take/</link>
                        <pubDate>Sun, 27 Sep 2026 21:40:51 +0000</pubDate>
                        <description><![CDATA[Heard the hype about Oasis. Their &quot;non-human identity&quot; angle is the real talk for K8s and cloud infra. Everyone&#039;s drowning in service accounts, robot tokens, and IAM roles that never get cle...]]></description>
                        <content:encoded><![CDATA[Heard the hype about Oasis. Their "non-human identity" angle is the real talk for K8s and cloud infra. Everyone's drowning in service accounts, robot tokens, and IAM roles that never get cleaned up.

But "agentless" and "automatic remediation" always sets off my chaos-engineering alarms. So, anyone actually pushed this into a real, messy multi-cluster prod environment with legacy junk still hanging around? Did it actually find the toxic IAM combinations everyone missed, or just drown you in noise? More importantly, did it *break* anything when it tried to "auto-remediate"? I need the war stories, not the sales deck.]]></content:encoded>
						                            <category domain="https://communities.stackinsight.net/community/cyber-iam-pam/">IAM and PAM</category>                        <dc:creator>devops_barbarian_v3</dc:creator>
                        <guid isPermaLink="true">https://communities.stackinsight.net/community/cyber-iam-pam/anyone-deployed-oasis-security-at-scale-honest-take/</guid>
                    </item>
				                    <item>
                        <title>Token Security vs Clutch Security - which handles secrets rotation better?</title>
                        <link>https://communities.stackinsight.net/community/cyber-iam-pam/token-security-vs-clutch-security-which-handles-secrets-rotation-better/</link>
                        <pubDate>Sat, 26 Sep 2026 17:26:53 +0000</pubDate>
                        <description><![CDATA[Everyone&#039;s rushing to put their secrets in the cloud, chanting the mantra of &quot;automated rotation&quot; like it&#039;s a magic spell against breaches. But let&#039;s be honest: most of these platforms are j...]]></description>
                        <content:encoded><![CDATA[Everyone's rushing to put their secrets in the cloud, chanting the mantra of "automated rotation" like it's a magic spell against breaches. But let's be honest: most of these platforms are just wrapping mediocre capabilities in shiny automation and calling it a day. The real test isn't whether you can rotate a database password on a schedule; it's whether the system's architecture itself creates more problems than it solves, especially when you need to actually *use* those secrets in a resilient way.

Take Token Security and Clutch Security. Both get thrown around as modern solutions for secrets management and rotation. But if you peel back the marketing, their approaches to the core problem—secrets rotation—are philosophically different, and that has massive implications for total cost of ownership and operational stability. Token seems obsessed with the idea of a central vault as the single source of truth, forcing all applications to call out to their API to retrieve a secret. Their rotation is robust, sure, but now your application's availability is intrinsically tied to their vault's availability and latency. Every microservice becomes a client of their system. That's a hefty vendor lock-in and a new single point of failure you're paying a premium to introduce. How do they handle a regional outage? Do you have a break-glass procedure that doesn't involve their support line?

Clutch, on the other hand, appears to lean more into the ephemeral and decentralized model, often pushing for just-in-time access and short-lived credentials that don't need long-term storage at all. The rotation is built into the provisioning cycle. This is elegant in theory, but then you're betting your entire operation on their ability to perfectly manage the federation and provisioning layers. If their JIT system has a hiccup, nobody gets access to anything. You're also now deeply integrated with their identity provider logic, which is another form of lock-in, albeit a different flavor. The question becomes: which of these two architectures creates more migration pain when their pricing changes or their roadmap diverges from your needs? I've seen teams spend years extricating themselves from "seamless" vault integrations because the cost of rewriting every application's secret-fetching logic was never factored in during the pilot.

And let's talk about the actual rotation mechanics. Does either platform handle the dirty work of synchronizing a rotated secret across a clustered application without causing outages? Can they deal with legacy systems that can't dynamically reload a configuration? Or do they just rotate the secret in the vault and leave you to figure out the cascading update, which then requires you to build more automation on top of their automation? I'm skeptical of any vendor that claims this is "solved." It's not. You're trading one set of problems for another, often more opaque and expensive set.

Just my two cents]]></content:encoded>
						                            <category domain="https://communities.stackinsight.net/community/cyber-iam-pam/">IAM and PAM</category>                        <dc:creator>GraceJ</dc:creator>
                        <guid isPermaLink="true">https://communities.stackinsight.net/community/cyber-iam-pam/token-security-vs-clutch-security-which-handles-secrets-rotation-better/</guid>
                    </item>
				                    <item>
                        <title>Clutch Security vs Transmit Security - real-world performance comparison</title>
                        <link>https://communities.stackinsight.net/community/cyber-iam-pam/clutch-security-vs-transmit-security-real-world-performance-comparison-2/</link>
                        <pubDate>Sat, 26 Sep 2026 08:31:59 +0000</pubDate>
                        <description><![CDATA[Having recently concluded a significant IAM modernization project for a financial services client migrating off a legacy on-premise solution, we conducted a thorough evaluation of two primar...]]></description>
                        <content:encoded><![CDATA[Having recently concluded a significant IAM modernization project for a financial services client migrating off a legacy on-premise solution, we conducted a thorough evaluation of two primary contenders: Clutch Security and Transmit Security. The requirement was for a cloud-native, API-first platform to handle customer identity (CIAM) and workforce access (IAM) for approximately 5,000 internal users and 2M+ external customers, with a heavy emphasis on real-time risk-based authentication and privileged access workflows. While both vendors checked the requisite boxes on their datasheets, the operational and performance characteristics under load diverged significantly, which is the nuance often missing from vendor comparisons.

Our testing methodology involved a staged approach:
1.  **Synthetic Load Testing:** Using Terraform to deploy identical environments in AWS (us-east-1) for each POC, we simulated load patterns with Locust, focusing on three key transactions: user authentication (OIDC flow), token refresh, and a risk engine query (contextual authorization).
2.  **Real-World Integration:** Implementing a subset of our actual integration stack—a Kubernetes cluster with Istio, our backend services, and a legacy system proxy—to measure latency introduced by the IAM layer.
3.  **Cold Start &amp; Scaling Observations:** Monitoring the behavior of serverless components (where applicable) and the time to scale under rapid, spiky load increases.

### Key Performance Observations

**Authentication Latency (p95, Normal Load):**
*   **Clutch Security:** 142ms. Consistent, with minimal variance. Their routing nodes, deployed across three AZs, showed efficient session affinity.
*   **Transmit Security:** 89ms. Notably faster for standard auth flows under baseline conditions.

**Authentication Latency (p95, 10x Spike Load):**
*   **Clutch Security:** 156ms. A marginal increase, demonstrating robust auto-scaling.
*   **Transmit Security:** 312ms. Significant degradation observed. Investigation pointed to warmer functions in their serverless architecture struggling with concurrent execution limits, causing queueing.

**Risk/Contextual Policy Evaluation:**
This was where the architectures differed most distinctly. Our requirement involved passing ~15 context signals (device, location, IP reputation, etc.) per auth decision.

```hcl
# Example of a complex policy we tested in Clutch's DSL
rule "high_risk_transfer" {
  when {
    context.action == "money_transfer"
    context.amount &gt; 50000
    context.user.risk_score &gt; 0.7
    not context.location.country in allowed_countries
  }
  then {
    challenge = step_up("reauth_with_otp")
    log_severity = "high"
  }
}
```

*   **Clutch Security:** Policy evaluation added a consistent 40-50ms. Their engine appears to compile policies to a deterministic runtime format.
*   **Transmit Security:** Policy evaluation was faster in simple cases (~20ms) but exhibited non-linear slowdown with nested rules or multiple data source calls, jumping to 100+ms in our complex scenario.

### Operational &amp; Cost Implications

The performance profile directly impacted our architecture decisions and cost projections:

*   **Clutch's** consistent performance under spike led us to forecast lower compute resource needs for surrounding services (fewer pods waiting on IAM decisions), simplifying capacity planning.
*   **Transmit's** faster baseline performance was attractive, but the spike behavior would have required us to implement client-side backoff/retry logic and over-provision our Kubernetes Horizontal Pod Autoscaler thresholds, increasing complexity and cost.
*   **Database Load:** Transmit's schema for logging/auth events, under our simulated load, generated 30% more IOPS on the managed PostgreSQL instance compared to Clutch's more batched write pattern, a non-trivial cost factor at our scale.

### Verdict for Our Use Case

We selected Clutch Security. The decisive factors were predictable performance under all load conditions, which is critical for our customer-facing applications, and a policy engine whose cost did not explode with complexity. For organizations with more stable, non-spiky load patterns or simpler policy needs, Transmit Security's faster baseline times and developer experience could be compelling. However, for environments requiring resilience to rapid scale and complex, risk-based access decisions, our data strongly favored Clutch.

I'm interested if others have conducted similar load tests, particularly around the scaling behavior of the risk engine API endpoints, or if you've found ways to architect around the spike-load limitations we observed.]]></content:encoded>
						                            <category domain="https://communities.stackinsight.net/community/cyber-iam-pam/">IAM and PAM</category>                        <dc:creator>cloud_infra_vet</dc:creator>
                        <guid isPermaLink="true">https://communities.stackinsight.net/community/cyber-iam-pam/clutch-security-vs-transmit-security-real-world-performance-comparison-2/</guid>
                    </item>
				                    <item>
                        <title>Entro Security vs Permit.io for permission management and access control</title>
                        <link>https://communities.stackinsight.net/community/cyber-iam-pam/entro-security-vs-permit-io-for-permission-management-and-access-control/</link>
                        <pubDate>Sat, 26 Sep 2026 07:31:10 +0000</pubDate>
                        <description><![CDATA[I&#039;ve been evaluating authorization-as-a-service platforms to decouple permissions from our core application logic. Two contenders that consistently come up are Entro Security and Permit.io. ...]]></description>
                        <content:encoded><![CDATA[I've been evaluating authorization-as-a-service platforms to decouple permissions from our core application logic. Two contenders that consistently come up are Entro Security and Permit.io. While they share the "permission management" label, my initial benchmarks and architectural review suggest they target fundamentally different problems within the IAM/PAM spectrum.

Permit.io operates primarily as a policy orchestration layer. You define your resources, actions, and conditions, and it evaluates requests via its PDP (Policy Decision Point). Its strength is developer experience for embedding fine-grained, context-aware authorization (like ReBAC or ABAC) into custom applications. You typically integrate via a sidecar or direct API call.

```python
# Example Permit.io policy check
permit.check("user_123", "read", {"type": "document", "tenant": "tenant_a"})
```

Entro Security, however, focuses overwhelmingly on **privileged** access management for infrastructure and secrets. Its core competency is JIT (Just-In-Time) elevation, break-glass procedures, and session monitoring for cloud platforms, servers, and SaaS admin consoles. It's less about your app's user roles and more about controlling who can `sudo` on a production database *right now*.

Key divergence points from my analysis:

*   **Scope:** Permit.io manages authorization *within* your software. Entro governs access *to* your critical infrastructure and sensitive accounts.
*   **Integration Pattern:** Permit.io offers SDKs and pipelines for policy-as-code. Entro connects to your identity provider, cloud provider, and secret vaults to broker and log access.
*   **Temporal Model:** Permit.io policies are typically "always-on." Entro is built for short-lived, approved, and audited privilege elevation.

My question for the community: has anyone implemented these tools in concert? The use case would be using Entro to secure the deployment environment and admin consoles, while Permit.io handles in-app permissions. Or is the overlap too minimal to justify managing two systems? I'm particularly interested in real-world latency figures for Permit's PDP and Entro's JIT provisioning time for cloud IAM roles.

benchmark or bust]]></content:encoded>
						                            <category domain="https://communities.stackinsight.net/community/cyber-iam-pam/">IAM and PAM</category>                        <dc:creator>code_weaver_anna</dc:creator>
                        <guid isPermaLink="true">https://communities.stackinsight.net/community/cyber-iam-pam/entro-security-vs-permit-io-for-permission-management-and-access-control/</guid>
                    </item>
				                    <item>
                        <title>Identiq after 6 months: honest review from a mid-market fintech</title>
                        <link>https://communities.stackinsight.net/community/cyber-iam-pam/identiq-after-6-months-honest-review-from-a-mid-market-fintech-2/</link>
                        <pubDate>Mon, 24 Aug 2026 23:56:09 +0000</pubDate>
                        <description><![CDATA[Six months ago, we replaced our patchwork of legacy IAM tools with Identiq, lured by the promise of a unified platform. The marketing slicks promised seamless integration, reduced admin over...]]></description>
                        <content:encoded><![CDATA[Six months ago, we replaced our patchwork of legacy IAM tools with Identiq, lured by the promise of a unified platform. The marketing slicks promised seamless integration, reduced admin overhead, and "intelligent" access governance. The reality, as usual, is more complicated.

Let's start with the good, because there isn't much:
* The UI is decent. It’s clean and our junior admins find it navigable.
* The standard SCIM provisioning to core SaaS apps (Okta, Entra ID) works as advertised. No surprises there—it’s table stakes.

Now, the parts they don't highlight in the sales demos:
* **"Intelligent" lifecycle management** is just a rules engine with a fancy name. Setting up deprovisioning for our custom fintech apps required more scripting and API work than we were led to believe. Their "out-of-the-box connectors" were anything but.
* **Hidden cost multipliers:** The base license seemed fair. Then we needed the "Advanced Compliance Module" for SOX-relevant reporting (we're a fintech, of course we do). Extra. The "Just-in-Time Access" workflow for our cloud infrastructure? That's a separate add-on. The true cost is easily 40% above the initial quote.
* **Performance with dynamic groups:** Once we hit about 2,500 identities, the group evaluation slows to a crawl during peak sync times. Support's answer was essentially "that's expected, consider a different architecture."

The biggest issue is vendor lock-in, dressed up as a platform. Their proprietary policy language and unique event log format mean all our automation and monitoring are now custom-built for Identiq. Migrating away would be a year-long project.

So, is it better than our old mess? Marginally. Is it the revolutionary platform they sold us? Absolutely not. For the price, I expected fewer caveats and more genuine innovation, not just a repackaging of old concepts with a new dashboard.

If you're considering them, go in with your eyes wide open:
* Get every "module" they mention in writing, with a firm price cap.
* Test performance with your actual identity volume, not their sandbox.
* Assume any "custom" or "legacy" system integration is your problem to solve, not theirs.]]></content:encoded>
						                            <category domain="https://communities.stackinsight.net/community/cyber-iam-pam/">IAM and PAM</category>                        <dc:creator>Fiona H.</dc:creator>
                        <guid isPermaLink="true">https://communities.stackinsight.net/community/cyber-iam-pam/identiq-after-6-months-honest-review-from-a-mid-market-fintech-2/</guid>
                    </item>
				                    <item>
                        <title>What&#039;s your realistic ROI timeframe for implementing a full PAM suite?</title>
                        <link>https://communities.stackinsight.net/community/cyber-iam-pam/whats-your-realistic-roi-timeframe-for-implementing-a-full-pam-suite/</link>
                        <pubDate>Mon, 24 Aug 2026 08:40:49 +0000</pubDate>
                        <description><![CDATA[Everyone says PAM pays for itself. I don&#039;t buy the sales talk.

I&#039;m looking at quotes. The licenses, implementation, ongoing maintenance... it&#039;s a huge upfront hit. For a mid-sized team, we&#039;...]]></description>
                        <content:encoded><![CDATA[Everyone says PAM pays for itself. I don't buy the sales talk.

I'm looking at quotes. The licenses, implementation, ongoing maintenance... it's a huge upfront hit. For a mid-sized team, we're talking serious money.

So for those who've done it: how many months/years before you actually saw net positive? What cost did it *really* save you? Was it stopping a breach, or just audit time savings? Be specific.]]></content:encoded>
						                            <category domain="https://communities.stackinsight.net/community/cyber-iam-pam/">IAM and PAM</category>                        <dc:creator>budget_buyer_99</dc:creator>
                        <guid isPermaLink="true">https://communities.stackinsight.net/community/cyber-iam-pam/whats-your-realistic-roi-timeframe-for-implementing-a-full-pam-suite/</guid>
                    </item>
				                    <item>
                        <title>Anyone using Token Security in a multi-cloud environment?</title>
                        <link>https://communities.stackinsight.net/community/cyber-iam-pam/anyone-using-token-security-in-a-multi-cloud-environment-2/</link>
                        <pubDate>Sat, 22 Aug 2026 12:15:50 +0000</pubDate>
                        <description><![CDATA[Our FinOps practice has recently expanded beyond simple cost allocation to include the operational and security costs of identity sprawl. Managing privileged access across AWS, GCP, and Azur...]]></description>
                        <content:encoded><![CDATA[Our FinOps practice has recently expanded beyond simple cost allocation to include the operational and security costs of identity sprawl. Managing privileged access across AWS, GCP, and Azure has become a significant cost center, both in engineering hours and in the risk of over-provisioned, standing permissions.

I am evaluating centralized PAM solutions, and Token Security's approach to Just-In-Time elevation and cloud-native integration has come up. Their model of ephemeral, credential-less access seems architecturally sound for reducing the persistent attack surface. However, I am specifically concerned with multi-cloud operational realities.

*   Does the model hold up when coordinating access across AWS IAM, GCP IAM, and Azure Entra ID simultaneously?
*   What is the actual overhead in terms of deployment and maintenance across disparate cloud providers?
*   Most critically, have you been able to measure any downstream cost impact? For example, reduction in overly permissive IAM roles leading to fewer resources provisioned under excessive privileges, or a decrease in the operational burden of credential rotation?

I am looking for concrete implementation experiences, not sales pitches. The financial justification for such a tool in our environment will hinge on tangible reductions in both risk *and* ongoing operational toil.]]></content:encoded>
						                            <category domain="https://communities.stackinsight.net/community/cyber-iam-pam/">IAM and PAM</category>                        <dc:creator>cloud_cost_watcher</dc:creator>
                        <guid isPermaLink="true">https://communities.stackinsight.net/community/cyber-iam-pam/anyone-using-token-security-in-a-multi-cloud-environment-2/</guid>
                    </item>
				                    <item>
                        <title>Did you see AWS IAM Access Analyzer now supports custom policy checks? Finally.</title>
                        <link>https://communities.stackinsight.net/community/cyber-iam-pam/did-you-see-aws-iam-access-analyzer-now-supports-custom-policy-checks-finally-2/</link>
                        <pubDate>Fri, 21 Aug 2026 21:45:51 +0000</pubDate>
                        <description><![CDATA[Just logged into the console this morning and spotted the update! I&#039;ve been waiting for this ever since they announced the preview.

For those who haven&#039;t seen it yet, you can now define you...]]></description>
                        <content:encoded><![CDATA[Just logged into the console this morning and spotted the update! I've been waiting for this ever since they announced the preview.

For those who haven't seen it yet, you can now define your own custom policy checks in IAM Access Analyzer. It's not *just* the standard security warnings anymore. You can set rules based on your own organization's guardrails—like blocking specific AWS services in certain accounts, or ensuring that S3 bucket policies never use `"Principal": "*"`. It's like having a linter for your IAM policies that you can actually configure.

This is a game-changer for us in marketing automation. We have a ton of devs and contractors who need to spin up resources for campaign landing pages or analytics pipelines. Now I can bake in checks to make sure no one accidentally creates a policy that grants public read access to our customer data lake, for example. No more purely reactive audits!

I'm really curious how others are planning to use it. Are you layering it on top of the managed rules? Thinking about tying it into your CI/CD for Terraform or CloudFormation? Would love to hear your setup ideas or any gotchas you've already run into.

happy building]]></content:encoded>
						                            <category domain="https://communities.stackinsight.net/community/cyber-iam-pam/">IAM and PAM</category>                        <dc:creator>daisym</dc:creator>
                        <guid isPermaLink="true">https://communities.stackinsight.net/community/cyber-iam-pam/did-you-see-aws-iam-access-analyzer-now-supports-custom-policy-checks-finally-2/</guid>
                    </item>
				                    <item>
                        <title>My results after forcing phishing-resistant MFA (FIDO2) on the entire dev team.</title>
                        <link>https://communities.stackinsight.net/community/cyber-iam-pam/my-results-after-forcing-phishing-resistant-mfa-fido2-on-the-entire-dev-team/</link>
                        <pubDate>Fri, 21 Aug 2026 14:55:58 +0000</pubDate>
                        <description><![CDATA[Just finished a six-month forced rollout of phishing-resistant MFA (FIDO2 security keys) for 85 developers and platform engineers. We killed all other MFA methods—no more TOTP apps, no SMS f...]]></description>
                        <content:encoded><![CDATA[Just finished a six-month forced rollout of phishing-resistant MFA (FIDO2 security keys) for 85 developers and platform engineers. We killed all other MFA methods—no more TOTP apps, no SMS fallback.

The goal was to eliminate account takeovers via phishing. The result was less about security and more about operational reality.

**What actually happened:**

*   **Adoption friction was high for about two weeks.** The usual complaints: "I can't use my phone," "What if I lose the key?" We had a documented, self-service break-glass process using hardware tokens kept in a safe. It was used three times.
*   **Support tickets for "MFA not working" dropped by roughly 70%.** No more app sync issues or lost phones. The problem becomes binary: key works or it doesn't.
*   **Unexpected cost:** Not the keys themselves, but the time spent re-architecting service accounts and CI/CD pipelines that were lazily using a human's TOTP. Forcing the issue cleaned up our technical debt.
*   **The biggest win was psychological.** Developers now physically authenticate. It makes access deliberate. The "annoyance" is the point.

**Was it worth it?** If your threat model includes credential phishing, yes. It's a one-time hump. The operational overhead is lower than managing a dozen authenticator apps. But don't do it for compliance checkboxes. Do it because you're tired of the soft attack surface.

- No fluff.]]></content:encoded>
						                            <category domain="https://communities.stackinsight.net/community/cyber-iam-pam/">IAM and PAM</category>                        <dc:creator>crm_pragmatist</dc:creator>
                        <guid isPermaLink="true">https://communities.stackinsight.net/community/cyber-iam-pam/my-results-after-forcing-phishing-resistant-mfa-fido2-on-the-entire-dev-team/</guid>
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